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Opening Quotation
“goods that have become so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law”
This enacted definition directs the reader back to real property law. It does not make attachment alone decisive or supply one answer for sales, tenant removal, taxation and secured lending. Chapter 3 separated resources from the legal relations concerning them. This chapter asks how a classification changes the particular question presented. The commercial-law examples use Virginia enactments alongside identified UCC model provisions; judicial examples retain their jurisdictions and procedural settings.
Key Principles
- Identify the legal purpose before assigning a category. The same equipment can raise different questions in a sale, lease, financing transaction or condemnation proceeding. Classification alone does not establish jurisdiction, tax treatment or insurance coverage.
- Distinguish land from particular interests concerning it. Describe the parcel, attachments and claimed rights separately; do not infer an unlimited vertical estate or ownership of every associated resource.
- Use real/personal and tangible/intangible as starting vocabulary. Check the definition in the governing enactment rather than assume every statute uses the same residual categories.
- Keep historical and modern taxonomies distinct. Blackstone’s corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments are historical categories; they are not a universal synonym for present possession and nonpossession.
- Identify ownership and public obligations separately. Government ownership, public access, public trust duties and regulation of private property present different questions.
- Examine annexation, adaptation and objective intention in their governing context. Strain addresses a Washington house sale; Kaiser Woodcraft addresses New York condemnation compensation.
- Do not assume every business item is a compensable trade fixture, or that every tenant attachment is removable. The relationship, governing law, agreement, timing and physical consequences require examination.
- Distinguish creation, attachment, perfection, priority and enforcement. Filing is not itself an agreement creating an enforceable security interest. Virginia Code § 8.9A-203 supplies a separate attachment inquiry.
- Read the whole applicable priority path. Virginia Code § 8.9A-334(c) states the default, with exceptions and conditions in subsections (d)–(h), including construction mortgages.
- Treat UCC texts and Restatements according to their legal force. Model provisions organize research; the applicable enactment and governing decisions determine the result.
Learning Objectives
- Explain why a resource label must be tied to a jurisdiction, date and legal purpose.
- Distinguish a parcel from the physical objects and separate rights associated with it.
- Separate tangible objects, payment rights and intellectual rights without assuming a universal transfer rule.
- Apply the annexation, adaptation and intention framework to the bounded Strain and Kaiser Woodcraft examples.
- Distinguish historical tenant-fixture reasoning from an applicable present removal entitlement.
- Build a fixture-financing timeline that separates attachment, perfection, priority and removal after default.
- Identify the additional information required for a Virginia fixture filing and the transmitting-utility exception.
- Explain the seller-severance, timber and third-party-record qualifications in the Virginia goods-to-be-severed provision.
- Compare a specified German temporary-attachment rule without treating all civil-law systems as identical.
- Use the chapter’s research sequence in Chapter 5 and the later estates, servitudes, leasehold and finance chapters.
Foundations of Classification
A classification is useful when it connects an identified resource or interest to a particular legal question. A refrigerator can be the subject of a sales contract, an installation on leased premises and collateral for a lender. Those descriptions are not mutually exclusive answers to one universal test. First identify the transaction, the competing claims and the law that supplies the relevant definition.
This chapter carries forward Chapter 3’s relational method. Describe the object, identify the asserted interest, identify the opposing claimant, and state the consequence sought. The examples that follow are selected illustrations from named jurisdictions rather than a fifty-state survey. Treat them as models for disciplined analysis, not substitutes for researching the governing law.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.2-107; Virginia Code § 8.9A-334.
Why Classifications Matter
The practical danger is not merely choosing the wrong noun. It is treating an answer to one legal question as the answer to another. Whether equipment is included in a house sale does not establish whether a lender has priority over a construction mortgage. Whether machinery is used in a business does not establish compensation as a trade fixture. Compare Strain, 25 Wash. 2d at 698–701, with Kaiser Woodcraft, 11 N.Y.3d at 359–64, and Virginia Code § 8.9A-334.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-334.
Historical Development
Blackstone’s book II, chapter 2, *16, distinguishes things real from things personal, associating the former with fixed subjects and the latter with movables. This is an eighteenth-century English account. It helps explain inherited vocabulary but does not establish that modern statutes classify every item by physical mobility alone.
At *17–*18, Blackstone distinguishes corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments and discusses the breadth of land and tenements. Read these terms in that historical setting. The classification is not equivalent to a present rule that every physical object is a possessory estate or every intangible claim is an interest in land.
Modern enacted categories can cut across that older vocabulary. Virginia Code § 8.9A-102 defines goods for secured transactions and includes fixtures, rather than excluding them simply because real property law recognizes an interest in them. The lesson is to read a definition with its statutory purpose and exclusions, not to construct one hierarchy that must govern all legal consequences.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-102; Blackstone, Commentaries, book II, chapter 2, *16–*18 (historical transcription) — historical commentary.
Legal Consequences of Classification
Identify the consequence and then the source. For a Virginia real-estate sale contract, § 11-2(6) supplies a writing requirement for maintaining an action, read with the section’s opening terms and applicable interpretive law. For a contract concerning things to be removed from land, § 8.2-107 distinguishes the subjects and the party doing the severing. These are different inquiries. A resource label does not alone choose the court, limitations period, remedy, tax or succession rule. Those conclusions require their own governing sources. Keep historical forms of action and succession terminology separate from a present procedural or probate claim.
Sources: Virginia Code § 11-2(6); Virginia Code § 8.2-107.
Real Property
Use real property here as introductory vocabulary for land and legally recognized interests concerning it. The legal description identifies a parcel; the instruments and applicable law identify the estate, burdens and associated rights. A surface description does not itself establish a right to water, minerals, airspace use or every item found on the premises. The following sections separate these subjects so that their classification can be tested for the particular purpose.
Sources: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Blackstone, Commentaries, book II, chapter 2, *16–*18 (historical transcription).
Land, Improvements, and Appurtenances
Separate the land, a constructed object and an associated right. An improvement describes work or an addition; fixture status asks a further legal question. An appurtenance claim requires identification of the claimed right and its relationship to the estate conveyed. For a sale, inspect the agreement and conveyance before deciding what the parties transferred. Strain illustrates why a seller’s undisclosed intention about installed objects is a different matter from an express reservation.
Blackstone’s *18 discussion of land’s vertical extent is historical context, not an unlimited present title guarantee. Even a broad description must be tested against the relevant interest, instrument and applicable law. A useful title investigation records separate entries for the surface estate, any asserted mineral interest, a right of access and an installed object, rather than describing all of them as incidents automatically owned by one person.
Airspace, Subsurface, and Mineral Interests
United States v. Causby involved frequent low military flights interfering with the use of a home and chicken farm. The Court recognized a compensable taking but remanded for findings describing the easement’s nature and duration. See 328 U.S. at 260–68. Do not convert that decision into a fixed altitude dividing all privately owned space from publicly owned space. Present 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) includes takeoff and landing needs in navigable airspace; § 40103(a)(2) states a qualified public transit right. These provisions and a constitutional compensation inquiry do different work.
For subsurface claims, inspect the chain of title and any grant or reservation instead of assuming the surface claimant owns every mineral or has granted every extraction right. Separate the asserted mineral estate from any claimed surface access, support, extraction or restoration obligation. The existence and scope of those rights require the applicable instrument and jurisdiction’s law. This classification step identifies the questions; it does not announce an automatic implied easement in every mineral severance.
Sources: 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2).
Water Rights
Distinguish land bordering water from an entitlement to divert, store or use it. California’s Water Resources Control Board describes both riparian and appropriative rights in its surface-water explanation; that example alone defeats a simple East-versus-West taxonomy. Its account identifies different sources and limits of asserted use, not unrestricted ownership of flowing water. For a particular claim, identify the water source, location, kind of asserted right, authorized use, priority and any governing permit, decree or other restriction. Consult the actual governing law rather than extending this agency explanation to every state, groundwater system, federal or tribal right.
Sources: California State Water Resources Control Board, Water Rights Process (agency explanation).
Personal Property
Personal property is useful introductory language for interests distinct from the land category under the relevant law. The question remains which statute, instrument or cause of action is using the term. A physical object, a payment entitlement and a right to exploit an intellectual work do not necessarily share the same transfer, perfection or enforcement rules. The distinctions below organize those inquiries without representing one residual definition as controlling every enactment.
Sources: 17 U.S.C. § 202; Virginia Code § 8.2-401.
Tangible Personal Property
Tangible personal property concerns physical objects, but the statutory category goods must be read in its own setting. Virginia Code § 8.9A-102(a)(44), for example, includes fixtures and specified other subjects and contains exclusions. Do not assume that the introductory word movable exhausts the definition. Nor does physical delivery universally determine title: § 8.2-401 allows explicit agreement on the manner and conditions of passage, supplies defaults, and addresses delivery without moving the goods. A sales transfer, a gift and attachment of security are separate transactions requiring their own rules.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-102.
Intangible Personal Property
Begin by distinguishing the object evidencing a right from the right itself. An invoice is not identical to the claim for payment, and a document may have a specific statutory role. In secured-transactions research, Virginia Code § 8.9A-102 separates accounts, chattel paper, deposit accounts, instruments, investment property and general intangibles. Use the actual definitions and exclusions; general intangible is not a synonym for every nonphysical asset. Do not infer one method of perfection or enforcement from the umbrella description intangible.
A concrete enacted example is 17 U.S.C. § 202: ownership of copyright is distinct from ownership of the material object embodying the work. Buying a painting or manuscript does not of itself transfer copyright in the work. That proposition does not answer the separate rules governing a copyright transfer, first-sale limitations, patents, trademarks, trade secrets or publicity rights. The different interests must be identified before their transfer or use is analyzed.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-102; 17 U.S.C. § 202.
Choses in Possession and Choses in Action
Use chose in possession and chose in action as inherited vocabulary for contrasting physical subjects and enforceable claims. A debt illustrates the latter inquiry, but the label does not establish that every claim is freely assignable or enforceable only through suit. Identify the right, any transfer restriction, the governing instrument and applicable law. Likewise, ownership of a document, entitlement to enforce an obligation and transfer of an underlying right should not be collapsed into possession of paper. The copyright/material-object distinction in 17 U.S.C. § 202 offers a related, though legally distinct, example of why the physical object and legal entitlement must be separated.
Sources: 17 U.S.C. § 202.
Corporeal and Incorporeal Property
Blackstone’s corporeal/incorporeal distinction concerns historical hereditaments, with physical and legally conceived subjects treated differently. See book II, chapter 2, *17. Retain that vocabulary when reading historical material without translating it automatically into every modern possessory/nonpossessory or tangible/intangible category. A present claim to cross land, occupy it or collect a debt must be identified from its source. Its traditional label alone does not establish the interest’s creation, transferability, duration or remedies.
Easements, Profits, and Licenses
For introductory analysis, distinguish a claimed right to use another parcel, a claimed right to enter and take resources, and a permission to enter. The terms easement, profit and license help frame those inquiries. They do not decide whether a particular permission is revocable, whether a right runs with land or what remedy is available. Identify the grant, conduct and applicable governing rules before making those conclusions. The detailed servitudes chapters are in Volume I, Part VII.
Assume a writing permits a neighbor to cross Blackacre for a stated purpose. Compare three questions: what conduct does it authorize, what obligation does it impose on the landholder, and does it bind a successor? Do not answer the third merely by answering the first. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes is a secondary research source for developing the issues; an applicable enactment or controlling decision must establish the governing rule.
Sources: Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (secondary source).
Franchises and Intellectual Interests
A governmental franchise and an intellectual-property entitlement may both concern valuable rights that cannot be understood simply by inspecting a physical object. Their sources and consequences nevertheless differ. For a franchise claim, identify the actual grant and governing law; do not presume transferability or inheritance merely from the word franchise. For intellectual rights, identify the particular statutory or other source. Section 202 of the Copyright Act illustrates separation of the right and the material object; it does not make copyrights, patents, trade secrets and government franchises legal equivalents or successors to one historical category.
Sources: 17 U.S.C. § 202.
Public and Private Property
Separate four questions: who holds the interest, whether the public may use the resource, whether public-trust duties attach, and whether government regulates it. These questions are related but not interchangeable. A privately operated enterprise does not become government property merely because it serves customers or is regulated; a public owner’s precise powers likewise require a governing source. Identify title, legal capacity and any trust or access obligation rather than treating mixed or quasi-public as a complete legal classification.
Sources: Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Public Ownership and Government Property
Illinois Central concerned submerged lands in Chicago’s harbor, not every government-owned street, park or building. The Court distinguished permissible limited dispositions from abdication of general trust control; legislative authorization alone did not resolve the problem. See 146 U.S. at 452–55. Use that decision for its bounded public-trust analysis, then research the relevant jurisdiction and resource. Neither public ownership nor a governmental/proprietary label by itself establishes identical alienation, access, immunity or trust rules for all public assets.
Sources: Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Private Ownership and Mixed Interests
Private ownership can involve different interests and different holders rather than one indivisible position. Record the legal person or persons holding each asserted interest and the source of any restriction. An association, trustee, utility or cooperative should not be assigned a public-law status merely because its activities benefit others. If the inquiry concerns a transition through condemnation, dedication, escheat or another mechanism, identify that mechanism’s governing requirements separately. The classification helps state the issue; it does not establish the power to transfer, extinguish or burden the interest.
Sources: Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
The Doctrine of Fixtures
Fixture doctrine asks when an object’s relationship to land has legal consequences for the competing parties. The relevant facts include the manner of installation, adaptation to the premises, objective circumstances and the relationship of the installer to the land. Those facts must be evaluated under the governing rule and purpose. Do not assume that a result concerning a seller and buyer resolves a tenant’s removal right or a secured creditor’s priority.
Consider a freestanding machine, the same machine anchored to prevent vibration, and machinery built into a specially designed plant. Treat these as different factual descriptions, not predetermined legal outcomes. Collect installation records, plans, photographs, agreements and evidence of the intended use. Then connect the facts to the actual issue. Strain and Kaiser Woodcraft illustrate the importance of context; Virginia’s fixture-financing provisions add distinct statutory questions.
Sources: Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 698–701, 172 P.2d 216 (1946); Matter of City of New York (Kaiser Woodcraft Corp.), 11 N.Y.3d 353 (2008).
Definition of Fixtures
Virginia Code § 8.9A-102(a)(41) defines fixture goods by reference to an interest arising under real property law. This is the Title 8.9A definition, not a self-contained national attachment test. For financing analysis, first establish the relevant real-property relationship and then examine the commercial-law provisions. Section 8.9A-334(a) also excludes ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement from a security interest under that title. A fixture collateral analysis therefore requires more than finding a financing statement that describes everything installed on the parcel.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-102.
The Annexation, Adaptation, and Intention Test
The familiar three considerations are annexation, adaptation to the use of the premises and an objectively inferred intention of permanence. In Kaiser Woodcraft, the New York Court of Appeals explains that approach in a condemnation dispute and quotes Teaff v. Hewitt in footnote 7. See 11 N.Y.3d at 359–64 & n.7. That attribution identifies the source actually consulted; it is not a claim to have independently collated the entire 1853 Teaff opinion. Nor is the three-part formulation a promise that every jurisdiction applies identical weights and exceptions.
Strain v. Green rejected the sellers’ undisclosed intention as determinative. The Washington court held the chandelier and sidelights, and two mirrors with their attached backings, went with the house; it treated the unsupported powder-room mirror differently. See 25 Wash. 2d at 698–701. Compare that house-sale setting with Kaiser Woodcraft, which rejected the assumption that business use or secondhand-value loss alone established compensable trade-fixture status and remanded. The contrast tests the legal purpose and facts before applying a label.
Sources: Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 698–701, 172 P.2d 216 (1946); Matter of City of New York (Kaiser Woodcraft Corp.), 11 N.Y.3d 353 (2008).
Trade, Agricultural, and Domestic Fixtures
Tenant fixtures require their own analysis. Van Ness v. Pacard discusses the historical trade exception in an 1829 District of Columbia dispute and distinguishes the relationship of landlord and tenant from other competing claimants. Its discussion of agricultural annexations expressly leaves the broader agricultural question undecided. See 27 U.S. at 143–47. The case is useful historical reasoning, not a present uniform rule allowing all trade, agricultural and domestic attachments to be removed after a tenancy ends.
For a bounded enacted example, California Civil Code § 1019, in the January 2026 reproduction, permits tenant removal during the term for listed trade, manufacture, ornament or domestic purposes, subject to its no-injury and integral-part qualifications. The text does not supply an automatic post-termination grace period or a universal agricultural category. Read the applicable current enactment, lease and decisions before applying a removal entitlement elsewhere. Distinguish tenant removal from compensation for a trade fixture in condemnation.
Sources: Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829); California Civil Code § 1019 (January 2026 reproduction).
Removal of Fixtures
Separate the tenant’s claimed entitlement from a creditor’s enforcement power. Identify the removal deadline, any surrender or extension agreement, the physical consequences, and obligations imposed by the applicable law and lease. Do not assume a reasonable period after termination exists everywhere or that every delay automatically transfers ownership. For the distinct Virginia secured-party route, § 8.9A-604(c) requires default and priority over all real-property owners and encumbrancers, subject to the rest of the part. Subsection (d) addresses physical injury repair and adequate assurance. It distinguishes repair costs from lost value due simply to the goods’ absence; that distinction should not be replaced with a universal restore-everything formula.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-604.
Fixtures in Conveyancing and Mortgage Law
For a sale, identify what the agreement and conveyance include or reserve, and resolve the classification under applicable law. Strain v. Green illustrates a deed without reservations and installed items that passed in its particular circumstances; it does not make pre-closing physical removal the only permissible method of exclusion. For financing, separately examine the mortgage’s scope, attachment of the competing security interest, perfection and priority. Virginia Code § 8.9A-334 supplies conditions and exceptions; an earlier perfected fixture interest does not automatically defeat every mortgage, and a mortgage does not automatically defeat every security interest.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-334; Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 698–701, 172 P.2d 216 (1946).
Fixtures Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
For the commercial-law analysis, use the applicable state enactment rather than treating the UCC model as a federal or universal statute. The examples here use Virginia. Section 8.9A-203 addresses attachment and enforceability; § 8.9A-310 supplies a general filing rule with specified exceptions; §§ 8.9A-501 and -502 address the filing office and statement requirements; § 8.9A-334 addresses competing real-property interests; § 8.9A-604 addresses enforcement involving fixtures. The five inquiries remain distinct. A sufficient public notice does not by itself establish a valid security agreement, priority over all claimants or an immediate right to remove.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-203; Virginia Code § 8.9A-310; Virginia Code § 8.9A-501; Virginia Code § 8.9A-502; Virginia Code § 8.9A-334; Virginia Code § 8.9A-604.
Fixture Filings
Under Virginia Code § 8.9A-501(a)(1)(B), a fixture filing generally goes to the office designated for recording a mortgage on the related land. Subsection (a)(2) separately addresses fixture goods when the statement is not a fixture filing, and subsection (b) provides a transmitting-utility exception. Section 8.9A-502(b) requires the subsection (a) information plus the fixture indication, real-property-record indication, sufficient land description and, when applicable, record-owner name. Subsection (c) makes a recorded mortgage effective as a fixture filing only on its stated conditions. Distinguish the proper office from the sufficiency and effect of the record. Finally, identify the specific priority provision: filing in one office is not a universal proxy for winning or losing.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-501; Virginia Code § 8.9A-502.
Priority Disputes Under UCC § 9-334
Build a timeline and identify the competing claimant before selecting a subsection. Virginia Code § 8.9A-334(c) subordinates the fixture security interest unless subsections (d)–(h) govern. Subsection (d) requires the debtor’s record interest or possession, a purchase-money interest, an encumbrancer/owner interest arising before the goods become fixtures, and timely fixture filing; it is expressly subject to subsection (h). Subsection (e)(1) includes the debtor condition and predecessor-in-title priority as well as earlier fixture filing. Subsection (e)(2) requires perfection before fixture status and specified readily removable goods. Subsections (e)(3)–(4), (f) and (g) address further defined situations. Construction mortgages receive the qualified protection in (h). A purchase-money label and filing within twenty days do not alone decide priority.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-334; Virginia Code § 8.2-107.
Comparative Analysis
Compare identified provisions rather than a single description of all civil-law systems. German Civil Code § 95 excludes attachments made only for a temporary purpose from the relevant component categories and separately addresses an authorized structure on another’s land. This is a specified enacted distinction, not a conclusion that German law reproduces American trade-fixture doctrine. It also gives no basis for saying that every civilian system refuses divided interests or lacks relevant attachment exceptions.
Even within a state’s commercial code, specialized rules can qualify a general fixture analysis. Virginia Code § 8.9A-334(e)(4) addresses defined manufactured-home transactions with statutory perfection; § 8.9A-501(b) addresses transmitting utilities. Identify the actual asset and statutory trigger before extending an ordinary fixture-filing analysis to a manufactured home, utility installation or other specialized resource. Do not infer that all modern infrastructure is governed by one expanding exception or that this chapter resolves its titling and tax consequences.
Sources: Virginia Code § 8.9A-334; German Civil Code (BGB) § 95; Virginia Code § 8.9A-501.
Practical Implications
Use the following as separate research tasks. A conclusion in one row should not be copied into another without its governing source. Collect the contract, instrument, records and dates before deciding the result.
- Sales: identify the promised transfer, the installed objects and any agreed reservation. Apply the actual state rule; Strain is a Washington illustration, not a universal rule about every appliance.
- Mortgage and foreclosure: identify the instruments, parties, fixture date, record dates and applicable branch of the priority statute. Do not replace § 8.9A-334 with an earlier-filing slogan.
- Probate: identify the decedent’s interest and the governing succession and administration law. Historical real/personal categories do not establish a present distribution outcome.
- Taxation: locate the taxing statute’s definitions, jurisdiction, assessment rule and exemptions. Do not assume every American jurisdiction taxes real and personal property in the same way or that a fixture result for a sale controls taxation.
- Insurance: read the policy’s covered-property terms, conditions and exclusions. A fixture label alone does not establish coverage or choose which policy pays.
- Secured transactions: distinguish attachment, perfection, priority and enforcement. Virginia’s enacted framework supplies separate provisions for those questions.
- Landlord and tenant: determine the applicable removal right, lease terms, deadline and physical consequences. Distinguish that inquiry from a condemned owner’s trade-fixture compensation.
- Recording and title: identify the applicable notice system and any alternative route or exception. Virginia’s transmitting-utility rule and conditional mortgage-as-filing rule illustrate why not every fixture interest follows one filing path.
Sources: Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 698–701, 172 P.2d 216 (1946); Virginia Code § 8.9A-334.
Common Misconceptions
Test an asserted classification against both the governing rule and the consequence sought. The following statements illustrate shortcuts that can conceal missing facts or legal conditions; the responses state the inquiry needed to avoid them.
- If I bolted it in, I can take it out. Attachment is evidence, not a complete removal entitlement. Identify the relationship, governing rule, agreement and objective circumstances.
- Trade fixtures are always removable after the lease. The deadline and conditions require applicable law; the California statutory example speaks of removal during the term and contains express qualifications.
- A business item is necessarily a compensable trade fixture. Kaiser Woodcraft rejected that shortcut in its New York condemnation setting.
- Movable goods cannot also be fixtures. Virginia’s secured-transactions goods definition includes fixtures; a physical description does not settle every statutory category.
- The deed must list every item, and anything omitted can be taken. Strain requires a contextual analysis; an agreement or express reservation must be examined separately from secret intention.
- A timely purchase-money fixture filing always beats the bank. Section 8.9A-334(d) contains additional conditions and a construction-mortgage qualification.
- Ownership of an object carries every intellectual right in it. Section 202 separates the copyright from the material object; other intellectual rights require their own sources.
- Surface ownership establishes every vertical or water entitlement. Separate title, particular grants and reservations, public transit, use rights and applicable regulation before drawing that conclusion.
Sources: Blackstone, Commentaries, book II, chapter 2, *16–*18 (historical transcription) — historical commentary; Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 698–701, 172 P.2d 216 (1946); Matter of City of New York (Kaiser Woodcraft Corp.), 11 N.Y.3d 353 (2008); Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829).
Chapter Summary
Classification is an analytical bridge, not a universal result. Distinguish a resource from each claimed interest, state the legal purpose and read the governing definition. Real/personal, tangible/intangible and corporeal/incorporeal are useful vocabularies, but historical categories must not be silently promoted into present rules for every statute and transaction. Public title, public use and public-trust duties likewise require separate identification.
Fixture analysis is especially sensitive to the parties and legal setting. Strain’s house sale and Kaiser Woodcraft’s condemnation dispute illustrate different applications; Van Ness supplies historical tenant-fixture reasoning. Virginia’s commercial enactments distinguish fixture status, attachment, filing sufficiency, priority and enforcement. Read the actual conditions and exceptions instead of assuming that attachment, business use or an early filing decides every dispute.
Chapter 5 turns to acquisition by possession and discovery. Carry forward the research sequence: identify the resource and claimed right, fix jurisdiction and purpose, locate the governing source, collect the necessary facts and dates, and state the consequence actually supported. The vocabulary developed here will recur in later estates, servitudes, leasehold and finance chapters, each of which must establish its own governing rules.
Further Reading
- Blackstone, Commentaries, book II, chapter 2, *16–*18, for the historical taxonomy in the consulted Yale transcription.
- Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692 (1946), and Kaiser Woodcraft, 11 N.Y.3d 353 (2008), read with their facts, procedural settings and dispositions.
- Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137 (1829), for historical tenant-fixture reasoning and its express reservation of the agricultural question.
- Virginia commercial-code and contract provisions identified in Primary Authorities; compare the particular enacted text with the relevant UCC model text and any other state’s enactment actually at issue.
- Restatements and the property, personal-property, commercial-code and real-estate-finance treatises identified above are additional research leads. A bibliography is not a statement that every edition or substantive passage has been inspected.
- For a contemporary comparison, In re Elmwood Ventures LLC, No. 25-10932 (MG), ECF No. 124 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2026), discusses fixture factors in a bankruptcy sanctions setting. Its selected fixture discussion is a research lead for that separate context, not a replacement for the governing state-law inquiry or a complete later-treatment history.
Primary sources
- United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
- Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)
- Virginia Code § 8.9A-102
- Virginia Code § 8.9A-203
- Virginia Code § 8.9A-310
- Virginia Code § 8.9A-334
- Virginia Code § 8.9A-501
- Virginia Code § 8.9A-502
- Virginia Code § 8.9A-604
- Virginia Code § 8.2-107
- Virginia Code § 8.2-401
- Virginia Code § 11-2(6)
- Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 698–701, 172 P.2d 216 (1946)
- Matter of City of New York (Kaiser Woodcraft Corp.), 11 N.Y.3d 353 (2008)
- Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829)
- California Civil Code § 1019 (January 2026 reproduction)
- German Civil Code (BGB) § 95
- 17 U.S.C. § 202
- 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32)
- 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2)
