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Opening Quotation
“Whether abandonment has occurred is predominantly a factual determination based upon all the relevant circumstances.”
Griffis concerned a school-purpose deed. Its distinction between interpreting a limitation and proving the event that triggers it frames the inquiry below; the quotation does not make abandonment the test for every defeasible estate.
Chapter 9 examined the fee simple absolute. This chapter turns to potentially perpetual fees subject to a limitation or condition. It explains the traditional classifications, the interests associated with each, and the need to test those classifications against the governing instrument and jurisdiction. Historical commentary, hypothetical examples, reported decisions, and enacted statutory examples have different roles in that inquiry.
Key Principles
- A defeasible fee is qualified by a limitation or condition. It is a potentially perpetual estate qualified by a limitation or condition. Its owner ordinarily can transfer the estate held, subject to the qualification and governing law; the owner cannot thereby give a transferee an unqualified fee.
- The traditional classification distinguishes three defeasible fees. The fee simple determinable terminates automatically on the occurrence of the stated event. The fee simple subject to a condition subsequent continues until the grantor (or successor) elects to exercise the reserved right of entry. The fee simple subject to an executory limitation is divested automatically on the specified event in favor of a third-person taker under the traditional classification. State statutes may alter that classification and enforcement mechanism.
- Each defeasible fee has a correlative future interest. The fee simple determinable leaves a possibility of reverter in the grantor. The fee simple subject to a condition subsequent leaves a right of entry (also called a power of termination) in the grantor. The fee simple subject to an executory limitation is followed by an executory interest in a third person. See the traditional distinctions illustrated in Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981). Terminology differs under the Third Restatement; see the classification note below.
- Automatic termination is distinguished from optional termination. The fee simple determinable terminates by operation of law on the occurrence of the stated event; no act of the grantor is required. The fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, by contrast, does not terminate on the occurrence of the condition; it becomes divestible, and the grantor must affirmatively exercise the power in a manner governing law permits.
- Language of duration signals a determinable fee; language of condition signals a fee subject to a condition subsequent. Words such as “so long as,” “while,” “during,” and “until” characteristically create a fee simple determinable. Words such as “provided that,” “on condition that,” “but if,” and “if it happens that,” coupled with an express right of re-entry, characteristically create a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
- Forfeitures are disfavored. Hardman illustrates Georgia's preference for a condition-subsequent construction where applicable. Mahrenholz illustrates a different deed construed as determinable. The instrument and jurisdiction control; no universal result follows from a single phrase.
- The correlative future interests are governed by distinct rules. Transfer and succession rules depend on jurisdiction. Illinois restricts alienation and devise under 765 ILCS 330/1, subject to § 6; Mahrenholz distinguishes inherited future interests from possessory title after termination. North Carolina separately addresses perpetuities and land-use duration. Read each rule for its own purpose.
- Modern statutes have narrowed the operation of defeasible fees. Statutes may limit these interests independently of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 supplies a sixty-year rule for specified land-use interests with exclusions; it does not create a general preservation-notice option.
- Defeasible fees are one possible structure for charitable, conservation, and public-use restrictions. A defeasible fee, conservation agreement, and charitable trust can address related objectives through different structures. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 121, art. 4 with § 36C-4-413. The instrument and governing law determine the rights and remedies.
- Perpetuities and independent statutory limits must be distinguished. The traditional treatment of grantor-held interests differs from that of many transferee interests. The reason should not be reduced to a claim that every reverter is vested: Hamm v. Hazelwood, No. 151158 (Va. June 23, 2016), discusses a contingent possibility of reverter and its perpetuities exclusion. Exemptions and state statutory alternatives require separate analysis.
Learning Objectives
- Define the family of defeasible estates and identify the three principal defeasible fees recognized under Anglo-American law.
- Distinguish the fee simple determinable, the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, and the fee simple subject to an executory limitation, both in the language that creates them and in their operational consequences.
- Identify and analyze each correlative future interest: the possibility of reverter, the right of entry (power of termination), and the executory interest.
- Explain the historical distinctions using the identified Blackstone passages and separate that commentary from present governing law.
- Apply the instrument-specific construction methods illustrated by the cases and distinguish interpretation from proof that a limiting event occurred.
- Distinguish traditional perpetuities analysis, statutory alternatives and exclusions, and independent limits on land-use interests.
- Identify the enacted transfer, perpetuities, conservation, and land-use provisions discussed here, including their jurisdictional and temporal limits.
- Diagnose and correct the recurring misconceptions concerning defeasible estates and their correlative future interests.
Defeasible Estates Defined
A defeasible fee is a fee simple whose continuation is qualified by a limitation or condition. Its duration is potentially perpetual, but the specified event may end it or permit its termination. A transfer of the present fee ordinarily carries that qualification; transferability is not a power to convey an unqualified estate. The associated future interest identifies who may take possession if the limitation operates. Compare Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981), with the power of termination discussed in El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013).
Present possession and a future interest must be analyzed separately. Calling the present estate a fee does not eliminate the future interest, and calling an interest future does not determine its current economic value. El Dorado recognizes a retained property interest capable of supporting a takings claim without deciding that a taking occurred. No rule in this chapter assigns every future interest a positive market value. Classification, enforceability, probability of possession, and valuation are distinct questions.
Sources: Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981); El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013).
Public Policy Underlying Conditional Ownership
Editorial analysis — conditional ownership can let a grantor link possession to a public, charitable, or private objective. It can also complicate later use and title examination. The reported school-site disputes in Mahrenholz and Griffis illustrate the tension between the purpose expressed in a deed and a successor's proposed use. These are policy considerations drawn from the cases, not findings about every conditional conveyance.
The applicable construction rules and statutory limits supply the legal answer. Hardman v. Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977), illustrates a preference against forfeiture when distinguishing two kinds of defeasible fee. North Carolina statutes separately address perpetuities and certain land-use future interests. Neither a construction preference nor a perpetuities exemption establishes that a particular restriction is valid forever.
Sources: Hardman v. Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
The Three Defeasible Fees
The traditional classification distinguishes three principal defeasible fees. Each is a fee simple qualified by a condition, and each is followed by a correlative future interest. The three differ in the mode of termination and in the identity of the future-interest holder.
First, the fee simple determinable terminates automatically on the occurrence of the stated event. The grantor's future interest is the possibility of reverter, which becomes possessory by operation of law at the instant the condition occurs. Second, the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent does not terminate on the occurrence of the condition; it becomes divestible. The grantor's future interest is the right of entry (also called the power of termination), which must be affirmatively exercised in the manner governing law permits. Third, under the traditional classification, a fee simple subject to an executory limitation ends automatically on the specified event in favor of a third person holding an executory interest. Governing statutes may change that classification or its enforcement. The three fees are structurally parallel but operationally distinct, and the distinctions have material practical consequences.
Sources: Griffis v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government, 164 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2005); 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *154–56 (1766), ch. 10; 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *172–74 (1766), ch. 11.
Historical Development
Blackstone's account supplies the historical vocabulary for the distinctions developed in this chapter. Book II, chapter 10, *154–56 separates an estate that ends on a limitation from one defeasible by entry or claim. Chapter 11, *172–74 examines executory devises and their limits on remoteness. Read together, the passages connect the duration of an estate, the mechanism of its termination, and the creation of a succeeding interest.
The central distinction is operational. If the grant limits the estate's duration, the stated event marks its end. If the grant instead makes the estate subject to a condition enforceable by entry or claim, breach gives the holder a power to terminate. Blackstone also explains how a limitation over to a third person can take effect when the stated event occurs. 2 Blackstone *154–56.
Executory devises extend the analysis beyond the ordinary remainder. Blackstone describes testamentary arrangements in which a future estate follows a fee and explains why limits on remoteness constrain them. His discussion links the power to direct succession with the law's concern about restraints extending too far into the future. 2 Blackstone *172–74.
The American decisions examined here use the historical vocabulary but apply their own law. Mahrenholz distinguishes automatic reverter from an exercisable right of entry; El Dorado discusses a simplified Restatement classification for its Texas takings question. The contrast teaches a research method: identify the local rule and the issue for which a category matters, rather than assuming terminology supplies a uniform national result.
Sources: 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *154–56 (1766), ch. 10; 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *172–74 (1766), ch. 11; El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013).
The Fee Simple Determinable
Under the traditional rule, a fee simple determinable ends automatically when its valid limitation is triggered, and the holder of the possibility of reverter becomes entitled to possession. Griffis, 164 S.W.3d 267, explains that no positive act of the heirs is needed for that termination. A dispute about the event or entitlement to possession may still require judicial proceedings.
Hypothetical — O conveys a fee to A so long as the land is used as a school, retaining the corresponding future interest. Assuming a valid limitation under governing law, A's estate endures while the required use continues and ends when the limiting event occurs. A grant lasting until a specified prohibited use begins illustrates the same durational structure. These examples isolate the classification question; actual conveyances also require valid formalities and lawful terms.
Sources: Griffis v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government, 164 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2005).
Language of Creation
Durational terms such as “so long as,” “while,” and “until” can signal a determinable fee. They are indicators, not a substitute for reading the entire conveyance. Mahrenholz, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, examined the limiting phrase together with the provision for return of the land. Hardman, 238 Ga. 551, reached a condition-subsequent classification under Georgia law despite language referring to a reverter. Neither isolated word determines every instrument.
Mixed language makes the relationship between the clauses especially important. A durational phrase and a reserved right of re-entry may point in different directions. The court must determine their combined effect within the instrument. Mahrenholz, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, illustrates the importance of reading the limiting language together with the provision for return of the land.
Sources: Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981); Hardman v. Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
The Possibility of Reverter
In the traditional classification, the grantor's future interest following a determinable fee is a possibility of reverter. Mahrenholz, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, distinguishes its automatic operation from a right of entry. A reversion after a lesser estate is a different traditional category. Terminology must be distinguished from the Third Restatement's grouping discussed below.
Transfer and succession present a separate inquiry. Illinois prohibits alienation and devise of the specified future interests under 765 ILCS 330/1, subject to § 6, while Mahrenholz recognizes inheritance of the retained interest. The timing of a conveyance matters: an attempted transfer of a future interest before breach differs from a conveyance of possessory title after a determinable fee has ended. The applicable statute and facts determine which transaction occurred and whether it was effective.
A grantor-retained possibility of reverter is traditionally outside the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. That exemption does not establish perpetual enforceability: independent statutory limits may extinguish the interest. The sixty-year land-use rule in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32, including its exclusions, illustrates a distinct limitation; its operation must not be conflated with a generic preservation-notice scheme.
Sources: Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 (specified land-use future interests).
The Fee Simple Subject to a Condition Subsequent
The fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is a fee simple that continues indefinitely but is subject to a clause of defeasance on the occurrence of which the grantor (or the grantor's successor) may re-enter and terminate the tenant's estate. The critical operational feature of this estate — the feature that distinguishes it from the fee simple determinable — is that the estate does not terminate on the occurrence of the condition. It becomes divestible; the grantor acquires the right, but not the duty, to terminate. Unless and until the grantor affirmatively exercises the right of entry, the tenant's estate continues, and the tenant retains full possession, use, and enjoyment of the land.
Hypothetical — O conveys a fee to A, provided that if the land is used for a stated prohibited purpose, O may terminate A's estate. This illustrates a reserved power rather than automatic termination. Whether an actual deed creates that power, a determinable fee, a covenant, or another arrangement depends on the entire instrument and governing law. Hardman, 238 Ga. 551, illustrates that construction inquiry; the hypothetical assumes valid formalities and a lawful condition.
Sources: Hardman v. Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
The Right of Entry (Power of Termination)
The right of entry, or power of termination, allows its holder to elect to end the estate after breach of the specified condition. The instrument and governing law determine the required act. In Hardman, the Georgia court treated an ejectment action as an exercise of that right. The traditional name therefore describes the power; it should not be taken as a general authorization for physical self-help.
Transferability, inheritance, release, and enforcement of a right of entry are separate questions. Illinois restricts alienation and devise under 765 ILCS 330/1, while § 6 contains exceptions. Other jurisdictions must be examined individually. A limit measured from creation of an interest is also distinct from a deadline for bringing proceedings after breach; neither deadline should be inferred from the other.
A grantor-held right of entry traditionally falls outside the common-law remoteness rule applicable to many transferee interests. It may nevertheless be limited by statute or lost through applicable enforcement rules. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 expressly includes a right of entry in its bounded land-use rule. Perpetuities, duration, preservation, and post-breach enforcement must therefore be checked separately.
Sources: Hardman v. Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 (specified land-use future interests).
The Duty to Elect and Waiver
Breach, election, and waiver are distinct questions. Breach activates the power; the holder must then exercise it in a legally effective manner. Conduct affecting enforcement may raise a further issue of waiver. Hardman, 238 Ga. 551, reversed partial summary judgment because factual questions remained about both breach and waiver. The applicable statute and local doctrine determine the effect of delay and the holder's conduct.
Sources: Hardman v. Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
The Fee Simple Subject to an Executory Limitation
The fee simple subject to an executory limitation is a fee simple that will be divested, on the occurrence of a specified event, in favor of a third person (not the grantor). It is the third of the three defeasible fees, and it differs from the first two chiefly in the identity of the future-interest holder: the correlative future interest is not retained by the grantor but is created in a third party, who takes as executory interest holder.
Hypothetical — O conveys land to A, but if the land ceases to be used for school purposes, then to B. In the traditional classification, B holds a shifting executory interest because it cuts short the estate of someone other than the grantor. A springing executory interest instead divests an interest retained by the grantor. These are distinct structures. The hypothetical assumes an effective, lawful limitation and a valid future interest; perpetuities rules and statutes may change the result. Blackstone discusses an automatically effective third-person limitation at Book II, chapter 10, *155–56; that historical discussion does not establish the current law of any particular state.
Sources: 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *172–74 (1766), ch. 11.
The Executory Interest
An executory interest takes effect by cutting short another interest rather than awaiting the natural expiration of a preceding particular estate. A shifting interest divests someone other than the grantor; a springing interest divests the grantor. Blackstone's testamentary examples illustrate the historical development of these arrangements. 2 Blackstone *172–74. Their modern validity also depends on the applicable perpetuities rules.
Under the classical Rule Against Perpetuities, an executory interest within the Rule must be certain at creation to vest or fail within the permitted period. A limitation that might take effect too remotely can therefore fail under that rule. The conclusion is not universal: an applicable exclusion, statutory alternative, or prospective-application provision may produce a different result. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 41-15(a), 41-18. Retaining a possibility of reverter does not automatically validate a separate remote gift to a third person; each interest must be analyzed on its own terms.
Modern perpetuities rules must be tied to the applicable enactment and the date of creation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-19 generally applies the Article to interests created on or after October 1, 1995, and separately provides for reformation of specified older interests. North Carolina provides an example: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-15(a) permits validation either by the stated lives-in-being test or by actual vesting or termination within ninety years. Section 41-18 excludes several categories, including specified successive charitable or governmental interests. The validation period must therefore be read together with the exclusions, temporal provisions, and separate limits on land-use interests.
Sources: 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *172–74 (1766), ch. 11; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 41-15–19.
Distinguishing the Three Defeasible Fees
The three defeasible fees may be distinguished along four axes. First, the mode of termination: the fee simple determinable terminates automatically; the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent becomes divestible on election; the fee simple subject to an executory limitation is divested automatically (default) in favor of a third person. Second, the identity of the future-interest holder: the possibility of reverter and the right of entry are retained by the grantor; the executory interest is held by a third person. Third, the applicable perpetuities rule: the possibility of reverter and the right of entry are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities; the executory interest is subject to it. Fourth, the language of creation: durational language characteristically creates a fee simple determinable; conditional language coupled with an express right of re-entry characteristically creates a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent; conditional language coupled with a gift-over to a third person characteristically creates a fee simple subject to an executory limitation.
Classification note — terminology can change while the underlying research question remains. In El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013), the Texas Supreme Court describes the Third Restatement's simplified grouping of future interests into reversions and remainders. The court also recognizes the retained power of termination as property capable of supporting an inverse-condemnation claim under the Texas Constitution. The Restatement classification is described here through the court's discussion; the decision left the occurrence of a taking for remand.
Subsequent proceedings matter. In City of McKinney v. El Dorado Land Co., No. 05-15-00067-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2016) (mem. op.), the appellate court reversed the later trial judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the land company. The Supreme Court of Texas denied review on January 20, 2017, in No. 16-0408; the denial does not itself endorse the appellate reasoning. The 2013 recognition of a compensable property interest must not be presented as a final finding that the city breached the restriction or owed compensation.
These distinctions have significant practical consequences. The choice among the three fees affects the timing of forfeiture, the identity of the successor, the availability of waiver, the applicability of statutes of limitation, and the enforceability of the condition against remote takers. A drafter who understands the distinctions and articulates them clearly in the conveyance produces an instrument whose operation is predictable; a drafter who confuses the categories produces an instrument that is likely to be construed against the intended forfeiture and in favor of the tenant.
Sources: El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013); City of McKinney v. El Dorado Land Co., No. 05-15-00067-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2016) (mem. op.).
Construction of Ambiguous Conveyances
Construction must begin with the instrument and governing jurisdiction. Hardman, 238 Ga. 551, applied Georgia rules favoring a condition subsequent over a determinable fee to avoid forfeiture where possible. Mahrenholz, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, nevertheless found the particular school deed created a determinable fee. A preference against forfeiture cannot replace analysis of what the instrument actually says.
Interpretation and proof must also be separated. The 1984 Mahrenholz opinion addresses limits on extrinsic evidence offered to change the deed's legal effect. Griffis, 164 S.W.3d 267, states Tennessee's approach to the deed as a whole and its surrounding circumstances. Once the limitation has been construed under the applicable rules, the court must determine whether the evidence establishes its triggering event.
A restriction should not be treated as a forfeiture provision merely because it appears in a deed. A promise, servitude, condition, and charitable-trust obligation can have different enforcement rules. For an enacted example of nonforfeiture enforcement, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-39 authorizes injunctions and other appropriate relief for qualifying conservation agreements. Determine the legal structure and available remedy from governing law and the instrument rather than assuming either damages or forfeiture is the only possible remedy.
Case study — classification and breach are separate questions. Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981), construed the school-site deed as creating a fee simple determinable and reversed dismissal on the pleadings. That classification did not itself establish that a reverter had occurred.
On the later appeal, Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 466 N.E.2d 322 (1984), held that the deed did not require classes to be held continuously. Conflicting evidence about the property's storage use precluded summary judgment, and the court again reversed and remanded. The teaching point is to separate the estate created, the event specified, proof that the event occurred, and the claimant's chain of title. Neither reported appellate disposition should be described as a final award of ownership.
Later persuasive use — Griffis v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government, 164 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2005), agreed with Mahrenholz that school use need not consist solely of classroom instruction. It applied Tennessee deed-construction and abandonment principles, vacated the competing summary judgments, and remanded. That decision supports the limited interpretive point; it does not establish that every storage use satisfies every school-purpose deed or supply Illinois controlling law.
Sources: Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981); Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 466 N.E.2d 322 (1984); Griffis v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government, 164 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2005).
Charitable, Public-Use, and Conservation Conveyances
Public-use hypotheticals — O conveys land to a town so long as it is used as a park, or to a school district so long as it is used for specified school purposes, with a retained future interest. In the traditional classification these can illustrate determinable fees, assuming an effective limitation and no governing statutory alteration. The exact purpose, holder, duration, and termination mechanism need examination. Return to the grantor's family is not inevitable: succession, release, transfer restrictions, and extinction can change who holds the future interest.
Conservation agreements and charitable trusts offer different ways to organize rights and remedies. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 121-35, 121-38, and 121-39 define qualifying conservation agreements, recognize them as interests in land, and provide for enforcement. Section 36C-4-413 separately permits cy pres for qualifying charitable trusts, subject to its exceptions and the settlor's alternative plan. The choice of structure affects who may enforce the obligation, what relief is available, and how the purpose may be modified.
Sources: Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36C-4-413 (cy pres); N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 121, art. 4 (conservation agreements).
Environmental and Conservation Restrictions
Conservation restrictions require their own statutory and instrument-based analysis. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 121-38 and 121-39, qualifying agreements can endure perpetually or for a shorter stated period and can be enforced through equitable relief. Recording and modification are addressed separately in §§ 121-41 and 121-39.1. Those provisions do not establish eligibility for a federal income-tax deduction. No tax deduction should be inferred merely from calling a conveyance a conservation easement; federal eligibility, valuation, substantiation, and other requirements need a separate current review.
Sources: N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 121, art. 4 (conservation agreements).
Statutory Modifications
State statutes impose different limits on future interests associated with defeasible fees; a notice of preservation is not a universal means of extending them. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32(a) invalidates specified possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and executory interests dependent on events affecting land use if they do not vest in possession within sixty years after creation. Subsection (b) excludes specified charitable and governmental interests and arrangements relating solely to oil, gas, or minerals. The exclusions and temporal provisions belong to the rule itself and must be examined with the time limit.
A statutory rule can address transfer, duration, preservation, or the deadline for proceedings after breach; those are different mechanisms. Compare Illinois's transfer restriction and exceptions in 765 ILCS 330/1 and /6 with North Carolina's rule for specified land-use future interests in § 41-32. Mineral interests and tax consequences require their own analysis and are outside the statutory examples established here.
Modern drafting practice reflects these statutory modifications. Where a conservation or public-use restriction is intended to endure indefinitely, the drafter should consider whether the restriction is better structured as a conservation easement, a charitable trust, or a set of enforceable covenants and servitudes, rather than as a defeasible fee. Where a defeasible fee is nevertheless the chosen vehicle, the drafter should attend to the applicable marketable title act, the applicable perpetuities modifications, and the recording requirements, and should draft the condition and the correlative future interest with the precision that the classical doctrine requires.
Sources: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 (specified land-use future interests).
Comparative Analysis
Comparative analysis begins with the governing jurisdiction rather than an assumption that the traditional American categories apply everywhere. Within the United States, compare Illinois transfer restrictions in 765 ILCS 330/1 with the separate land-use duration rule in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32. These provisions address different questions and are not interchangeable. For each conveyance, identify the estate, future-interest holder, termination mechanism, transfer rules, and statutory limits before comparing outcomes.
The comparison also separates two uses of historical English material. Blackstone explains the vocabulary inherited by the American cases; contemporary foreign law requires its own legislation, decisions, and transitional rules. The comparative examples developed here are the specified American provisions, which regulate different aspects of conditional ownership.
Sources: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 (specified land-use future interests).
Practical Implications
The classification of a conveyance as creating one or another of the defeasible fees has substantial practical consequences for drafters, title examiners, litigators, and estate planners.
- Deed drafting. A drafter intending to create a defeasible fee must use language that unmistakably ties the endurance or divestment of the estate to the specified condition, and must select the appropriate future-interest structure. Durational language (“so long as,” “while,” “until”) creates a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter; conditional language coupled with an express reservation of re-entry creates a fee subject to a condition subsequent with a right of entry; conditional language coupled with a gift-over creates a fee subject to an executory limitation with an executory interest. Ambiguity is likely to be resolved against forfeiture.
- Title examination. The title examiner must identify any outstanding possibility of reverter, right of entry, or executory interest that burdens the fee. The applicable marketable title act, statute of limitations, and recording statute must be consulted to determine whether the future interest remains enforceable. Where a defeasible fee is in the chain of title, the examiner must consider whether the specified condition has occurred and, if so, whether the correlative future interest has been exercised or has been extinguished.
- Charitable and public-use conveyances. Compare the rights, enforcement mechanisms, duration, and modification rules of the available structures under governing law. No structure is universally preferable; the intended purpose and the parties' circumstances matter.
- Estate planning. A conditional family disposition requires analysis of validity, future interests, enforcement, and the intended succession plan. Tax and trust advice require separate review. This chapter does not recommend a particular structure for an individual estate plan.
- Litigation. Litigation concerning defeasible fees typically centers on three questions: whether the language of the conveyance created a condition of defeasance or a mere covenant; whether the specified condition has in fact occurred; and whether the correlative future interest has been exercised, extinguished, or waived. Each of these questions is fact-intensive and often outcome-determinative.
Sources: Hamm v. Hazelwood, No. 151158 (Va. June 23, 2016); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 (specified land-use future interests); 765 ILCS 330/1, /6 (transfer restrictions and exceptions).
Common Misconceptions
Because the defeasible fees combine features of the fee simple absolute with features of the future-interest system, they attract several persistent misconceptions that must be corrected before the doctrine may be applied with confidence.
- “The fee simple determinable and the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent are the same estate.” They are not. The fee simple determinable terminates automatically on the occurrence of the specified event; the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent becomes divestible only, and the grantor must affirmatively exercise the right of entry. The distinction affects the timing of forfeiture, the availability of waiver, and the operation of statutes of limitation.
- “A covenant in a deed operates as a condition of defeasance.” A covenant does not, merely by being a promise in a deed, produce forfeiture. Whether it binds successors and what legal or equitable remedies are available require separate analysis. To create a condition of defeasance the drafter must use language that unmistakably ties the endurance or continuation of the estate to the specified condition. Ambiguous language is typically construed as a covenant rather than a condition, in accordance with the judicial preference against forfeiture.
- “All defeasible-fee future interests are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.” The traditional remoteness treatment of a grantor-held interest differs from that of an executory interest. Do not equate exemption with an interest being vested for every purpose. Compare Hamm v. Hazelwood, No. 151158 (Va. June 23, 2016), and N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 41-15, 41-18, 41-32.
- “The possibility of reverter and the right of entry cannot be transferred inter vivos.” Transferability depends on the governing jurisdiction. Illinois, for example, restricts both alienation and devise under 765 ILCS 330/1, subject to the release and other exceptions in § 6. A national majority claim requires a separate jurisdictional survey.
- “The fee simple determinable terminates only when the grantor learns of the breach.” No. The estate terminates automatically on the occurrence of the specified event, regardless of the grantor's knowledge. The grantor's later actions may bear on the availability of ejectment or on damages, but the termination itself is by operation of law.
- “A charitable or public-use restriction is best drafted as a defeasible fee.” No structure is universally best. Compare the intended objective, rights of enforcement, statutory limits, and flexibility of modification. Conservation agreements and charitable trusts have their own governing rules; neither should be chosen on an assumed exemption from all title or enforcement difficulties.
- “A defeasible fee is a lesser estate than the fee simple absolute.” A defeasible fee is a fee, rather than a life estate or term of years, but its possible termination is a substantive qualification. Do not infer identical value, marketability, or transfer consequences from its potentially perpetual duration. A transferee ordinarily takes subject to the qualification.
- “The correlative future interest becomes possessory only after the grantor sues.” The premise is too broad even for a right of entry: governing law determines how the power must be exercised, and a lawsuit is not universally the sole method. In the traditional classification, a determinable fee or executory limitation ends automatically on the specified event, though litigation may still be needed to establish disputed facts or obtain possession.
Chapter Summary
This chapter examines potentially perpetual fees qualified by limitations or conditions and the future interests associated with them. A present estate and its future interest must be classified together. Transfer of the present fee ordinarily carries its qualification, and neither a future interest's value nor its enforceability follows from its name alone.
Anglo-American law recognizes three defeasible fees. The fee simple determinable terminates automatically on the occurrence of the specified event; the correlative future interest is the possibility of reverter, retained by the grantor. The fee simple subject to a condition subsequent becomes divestible on the occurrence of the specified event but does not terminate until the grantor affirmatively exercises the reserved right of entry (power of termination). The fee simple subject to an executory limitation is divested automatically on the specified event in favor of a third person under the traditional classification, subject to governing statutory changes.
The three defeasible fees are distinguished by the mode of termination, the identity of the future-interest holder, the applicable perpetuities rule, and the language of creation. Durational language (“so long as,” “while,” “until”) creates a determinable fee; conditional language coupled with an express reservation of re-entry creates a fee subject to a condition subsequent; conditional language coupled with a gift-over to a third person creates a fee subject to an executory limitation.
The historical account and the modern examples perform complementary roles. Blackstone explains the distinctions; the cases show their application to disputed instruments; the Illinois and North Carolina provisions show how statutes regulate particular interests. Their combined value lies in identifying the questions that must be answered for the governing jurisdiction.
The instrument, governing law, date of creation, and subsequent events must be examined together. A preference against forfeiture does not predetermine classification. A future interest's exemption from one rule does not exempt it from all statutory or equitable limits. The reported appellate histories likewise show that recognition of a property interest and ultimate success on the merits are separate matters.
Chapter 11 next examines life estates, whose duration is measured by a human life. Chapter 12 then examines the fee tail and its abolition or modification in American jurisdictions. These estates must be distinguished from the potentially perpetual fees examined here.
Further Reading
Begin with the question the instrument presents, then read the sources addressing that question. The following paths connect the principal authorities rather than repeat the entire bibliography.
- Classification and deed construction: Mahrenholz (1981). Follow it with the 1984 appeal to distinguish interpretation of the deed from proof of the limiting event.
- School-purpose limitations: Griffis (2005). Compare its Tennessee analysis with Mahrenholz and identify the role of the particular wording and evidence.
- Property interest and ultimate recovery: El Dorado (2013). Read the 2016 appellate disposition and the recorded review history alongside the initial decision.
- Statutory limits: North Carolina Chapter 41, Article 2. Compare its validation, exclusion, and temporal provisions with § 41-32 and the Illinois transfer provisions listed above.
- Historical vocabulary: Blackstone, Book II, chapter 10. Continue to chapter 11, *172–74, for the discussion of executory devises and remoteness.
Research scope — the chapter explains traditional classifications through the identified historical passages, reported decisions, and statutory examples. It is not a fifty-state or foreign-law survey. Targeted public research and the documented appellate history do not establish a complete citing history or exhaustive statutory currency. Application requires the governing jurisdiction, the date the interest was created, and the complete instrument.
Primary sources
- Hamm v. Hazelwood, No. 151158 (Va. June 23, 2016)
- Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981)
- Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 466 N.E.2d 322 (1984)
- Griffis v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government, 164 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2005)
- El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013)
- City of McKinney v. El Dorado Land Co., No. 05-15-00067-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2016) (mem. op.)
- Hardman v. Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977)
- N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 41-15, 41-18, 41-19 (statutory perpetuities provisions)
- N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-32 (specified land-use future interests)
- 765 ILCS 330/1, /6 (transfer restrictions and exceptions)
- N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 121, art. 4 (conservation agreements)
- N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36C-4-413 (cy pres)
