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Property Law·Foundations of Property Law — Second Edition·Research Article

Volume I·Part VII — Servitudes — Easements, Profits, Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes·Chapter 23

Part of: Volume I — Foundations of Property Law

Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes

Chapter 23

Published
August 7, 2026
Reading time
46 min
Difficulty
intermediate
Jurisdiction
United States
Category
Property Law
Authorities cited
4

Text

Contents▾

Opening Quotation

“That this Court has jurisdiction to enforce a contract between the owner of land and his neighbour purchasing a part of it, that the latter shall either use or abstain from using the land purchased in a particular way, is what I never knew disputed. … It is said that, the covenant being one which does not run with the land, this Court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased.”
— Lord Cottenham L.C., Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch.)

Chapters 21 and 22 distinguished the right to use another’s land from the right to take a resource from it. This chapter asks when a land-use promise binds a successor and what relief is available. Tulk v. Moxhay supplies the historical example of a restriction enforced in equity against a purchaser with notice.

Key Principles

  1. A real covenant is a promise respecting the use of land that is enforceable at law against successors, with damages as the remedy. Its historic requirements are a writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds, intent that the promise run, touch and concern, horizontal privity between the original covenanting parties, and vertical privity between the covenantor and the defendant successor. Restatement (First) of Property §§ 530–555 (1944).
  2. An equitable servitude is the same promise enforced in equity against a successor who took with notice, with the injunction as the remedy. Its requirements are a writing (or a common plan), intent, touch and concern, and notice. Neither horizontal nor vertical privity is required. Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.).
  3. The distinction between the two doctrines is a distinction of remedy and of proof, not of substance. A single promise may be both, and the plaintiff who seeks an injunction proves an equitable servitude while the plaintiff who seeks damages must prove a real covenant. This is the principal source of the field's notorious complexity.
  4. The burden and the benefit run separately and on different terms. The burden — the obligation to perform — is held to the strictest requirements, because it encumbers land in the hands of a person who did not promise. The benefit — the right to enforce — runs more freely, and at common law required no horizontal privity and only relaxed vertical privity.
  5. Touch and concern asks whether the promise relates to the enjoyment, use, or value of the land as land, rather than to the promisor personally. Restrictions on use touch and concern almost invariably; affirmative obligations to pay money were long doubted and are now generally sustained where the payment supports the burdened land. Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
  6. Horizontal privity is a requirement of the running of the burden at law only, and only in some jurisdictions. England required tenurial privity; Massachusetts and the majority American rule accept instantaneous privity — a covenant contained in the deed of conveyance itself; a minority requires no horizontal privity at all. Restatement (Third) § 2.4 abolishes it.
  7. Vertical privity concerns the relationship between the covenanting party and his successor. Strict vertical privity — succession to the entire estate — was required for the burden at law; relaxed vertical privity — succession to any interest — sufficed for the benefit. Equity requires neither, so an adverse possessor or a lessee may be bound by an equitable servitude.
  8. Notice is the foundation of equitable enforcement. Actual notice, constructive (record) notice, and inquiry notice arising from the visible character of a neighbourhood each suffice. A bona fide purchaser for value without notice takes free of the servitude, whatever its formal validity.
  9. A common plan of development may generate reciprocal negative servitudes implied against lots the developer conveyed without express restriction. The plan must have existed at the time of the first conveyance, and the purchaser must be chargeable with notice of it. Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925).
  10. Affirmative covenants to pay assessments are the structural foundation of the modern common-interest community. They run because the association performs functions that benefit the burdened land, and the assessment is enforceable in personam and as an equitable lien on the lot.
  11. The remedy determines the doctrine invoked; the doctrine does not determine the remedy. Damages at law compensate breach already committed; the injunction restrains breach continuing or threatened; and equity may deny the injunction and award damages where the hardship of enforcement is disproportionate to the benefit.
  12. Changed conditions terminate a servitude only when the change is so radical that the original purpose can no longer be substantially achieved. Change outside the restricted area, however dramatic, does not suffice while the interior of the tract retains its restricted character. Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624 (Nev. 1972).
  13. Waiver, abandonment, acquiescence, estoppel, and unclean hands are personal or general defences of distinct scope. Acquiescence in a neighbour's violation bars enforcement against that neighbour; a general pattern of tolerated violations may abandon the scheme as a whole.
  14. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes unifies easements, profits, covenants, and equitable servitudes into a single law of servitudes. It abolishes horizontal privity (§ 2.4), replaces touch and concern with a direct test of validity against public policy (§ 3.1), and states uniform rules of succession (§§ 5.1–5.9) and of modification and termination (§§ 7.1–7.15).
  15. Racially restrictive covenants are unenforceable and void. Judicial enforcement is state action forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); damages are equally barred, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3617, independently prohibits them. Restatement (Third) § 3.1(1).

Learning Objectives

On completing this chapter the reader should be able to:

  1. Define the real covenant and the equitable servitude and state precisely how each differs from the other and from the easement, the profit, the licence, and the personal contract.
  2. Trace the distinction between leasehold obligations, freehold restrictions, and modern servitude frameworks.
  3. Explain why the division between courts of law and courts of equity produced two doctrines governing a single transaction.
  4. State and apply the requirements for the running of the burden at law: writing, intent, touch and concern, horizontal privity, and vertical privity.
  5. State and apply the requirements for the running of the benefit, and explain why they are less demanding than those for the burden.
  6. Distinguish actual, constructive, and inquiry notice, and determine when a purchaser takes free of a servitude.
  7. Identify a common plan of development and determine whether reciprocal negative servitudes arise by implication.
  8. Analyze the enforceability of affirmative covenants, including assessment obligations in common-interest communities.
  9. Select and justify the appropriate remedy — damages, injunction, or both — and anticipate equitable defences.
  10. Apply the doctrines of changed conditions, relative hardship, waiver, abandonment, acquiescence, estoppel, merger, and release.
  11. Examine title for recorded restrictions and advise on drafting, recording, amendment, and curative practice.
  12. Evaluate the Restatement (Third)'s unified servitude framework against the classical two-track doctrine.

Primary Authorities

Secondary Authorities

Secondary authority is used here only to organize and explain the primary sources.

  • Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (Coke on Littleton) *384b–*385a (1628) — warranty, covenant, and the annexation of obligation to the estate.
  • 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *304–*306 (1766) — covenants real and the incidents of tenure.
  • 4 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law *480–*482 (1830) — the American reception of covenants running with the land.
  • Charles James Gale, A Treatise on the Law of Easements (1839; 20th ed. 2020) — the boundary between easement and restrictive covenant.
  • Emory Washburn, A Treatise on the American Law of Easements and Servitudes ch. 1, §§ 1–8 (4th ed. 1885) — negative easements and the reception of Tulk.
  • 2 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The Law of Real Property §§ 848–866 (3d ed. 1939) — the classical American synthesis of covenants and servitudes.
  • 1 Frederick Pollock & F. W. Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 34–40, 226–230 (2d ed. 1898) — warranty, tenure, and the medieval covenant.
  • A. W. B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law 116–120, 256–260 (2d ed. 1986) — the fate of the covenant after Quia Emptores.
  • J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History chs. 6, 17 (5th ed. 2019) — the jurisdictional division between law and Chancery.
  • Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261 (1982) — the intellectual foundation of the Restatement (Third).
  • Susan F. French, Highlights of the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 225 (2000).
  • Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1177 (1982).
  • Charles E. Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run with Land" (2d ed. 1947) — the classical American monograph and the source of the modern touch-and-concern analysis.
  • Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 167 (1970).
  • Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353 (1982).
  • 9 Powell on Real Property §§ 60.01–60.11 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.) — covenants and servitudes in current practice.
  • 2 American Law of Property §§ 9.1–9.40 (A. James Casner ed. 1952).
  • Robert G. Natelson, Law of Property Owners Associations (1989).
  • Gerald Korngold, Private Land Use Arrangements: Easements, Real Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes (2d ed. 2004).

The Definition of the Promissory Servitudes

A real covenant and an equitable servitude are historical ways of enforcing land-use promises against successors. The distinction often matters to the remedy sought and the proof required. Runyon v. Paley illustrates the separate inquiries under North Carolina law. The governing jurisdiction and instrument determine whether a given promise binds a successor.

Three elements are common to both. First, the obligation is promissory in origin. It does not carve a fragment of dominion out of the servient estate, as an easement or profit does; it binds the servient owner's conduct. Second, the obligation is annexed to land: it is created with the intent that it shall benefit and burden the parties' respective estates rather than their persons only, and it passes with those estates without further mention. Third, the obligation is enforceable against strangers to the promise. It is this third element that makes the covenant a servitude rather than a contract, and it is on this element alone that the law has expended four centuries of doctrinal ingenuity.

The subject matter may be negative or affirmative. A restrictive covenant forbids: no commercial use; no building within thirty feet of the street line; no structure exceeding two storeys; no sign, no fence, no outbuilding, no animal husbandry. An affirmative covenant requires: to maintain a party wall, to keep a boundary fence in repair, to supply water, to pay an annual assessment for the maintenance of common roads and beaches. The English rule for positive freehold covenants is illustrated by Rhone v. Stephens in 1994. U.S. assessment covenants can raise different questions under state law and governing documents. Chapter 24 examines common-interest communities.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley; Tulk v. Moxhay.

Historical Development: Leasehold and Freehold Covenants

Historically, leasehold covenants supplied a setting in which a successor could be bound through a relationship to the estate. Rhone v. Stephens distinguishes the treatment of leasehold covenants from the rule for positive covenants affecting freehold land.

Separate the landlord–tenant relationship from a promise made in connection with a freehold conveyance. The law governing one category does not by itself establish which obligations bind successors in the other.

Sources: Rhone v. Stephens.

Tulk v. Moxhay and the Rise of Equitable Enforcement

In 1808 Charles Augustus Tulk, who owned the garden square in Leicester Square together with several surrounding houses, sold the garden to one Elms, who covenanted for himself, his heirs, and assigns to maintain the square as an open pleasure ground, uncovered by buildings, and to permit the inhabitants of the surrounding houses to use it on payment of a reasonable rent. The land passed through several hands to Moxhay, whose deed did not contain the covenant but who admitted knowledge of it. Moxhay proposed to build. Tulk, still owning houses in the square, sought an injunction.

Lord Cottenham upheld the injunction without deciding whether the covenant ran at law. The issue, he said, is not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor and of which he had notice when he purchased. If equity did not intervene, it would be impossible for an owner to sell part of his land without the risk of the purchaser's immediately destroying the value of what he retained; and the purchaser with notice, who necessarily paid a price discounted by the restriction, would take a benefit at his vendor's expense.

The English cases distinguish restrictions on the use of land from duties to perform work. In Rhone v. Stephens, the House of Lords declined to enforce a roof-repair obligation against a successor to the covenantor. Notice of the obligation did not make it enforceable against that successor.

American decisions illustrate distinct routes to enforcement. Neponsit addressed an assessment covenant tied to shared facilities. Sanborn v. McLean addressed residential restrictions arising from a development scheme. The facts and governing rules of each jurisdiction matter.

Sources: Tulk v. Moxhay; Rhone v. Stephens.

Why Two Doctrines: The Jurisdictional Division and Its Consequences

Historically, the common-law courts and Chancery developed separate approaches. Tulk v. Moxhay illustrates equitable enforcement. Runyon v. Paley shows how a U.S. court later analyzed the distinction between a covenant running at law and a restriction enforceable in equity.

Merger of the courts did not merge the doctrines. The requirements remained attached to the remedies, so that after merger a single judge might hold that a covenant was enforceable by injunction but not by damages — enforceable as an equitable servitude because the defendant had notice, unenforceable as a real covenant because horizontal privity was absent. Runyon v. Paley in North Carolina in 1992 is the standard modern illustration of a court working through both sets of requirements in a single opinion and reaching different conclusions under each. The Restatement (First) of Property in 1944 canonized the division by treating real covenants in one set of sections and equitable servitudes in another, a structure the Restatement (Third) later described as the source of unnecessary complexity.

The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes ended the division as a matter of Institute doctrine. Section 1.4 provides that the terms real covenant and equitable servitude are subsumed within the single term covenant running with land; § 2.4 abolishes any requirement of privity of estate; § 3.1 replaces touch and concern with a direct inquiry into whether the servitude is illegal, unconstitutional, or violative of public policy; and §§ 8.1–8.3 make the full range of legal and equitable remedies available for the breach of any servitude, subject to ordinary equitable discretion. A substantial minority of American jurisdictions has adopted this framework in whole or in part; the remainder continue to apply the classical elements, and the practitioner must know both.

Sources: Tulk v. Moxhay; Runyon v. Paley.

The Running of the Burden at Law

The checklist below describes traditional issues that can arise when enforcing a covenant against a successor. Which elements apply depends on the jurisdiction and claim. In Runyon v. Paley, the North Carolina Supreme Court separately analyzed intent, touch and concern, and privity for enforcement at law.

  1. A writing. The covenant must satisfy the Statute of Frauds, either in a deed signed by the grantor and accepted by the grantee or in a separate signed instrument. Acceptance of a deed poll containing the covenant binds the grantee though he does not sign.
  2. Intent that the covenant run. The parties must have intended the obligation to bind successors. The traditional evidence is the phrase "heirs and assigns," but intent may be inferred from the nature of the covenant and the circumstances of the transaction.
  3. Touch and concern. The covenant must relate to the use, enjoyment, or value of the burdened land as land, and not merely to the covenantor personally.
  4. Horizontal privity. In most American jurisdictions the original covenanting parties must have had some relationship respecting the land independent of the covenant — typically, grantor and grantee in the conveyance containing the covenant.
  5. Vertical privity. The defendant must have succeeded to the entire estate held by the covenantor at the time of the promise.

A sixth element, notice, is not strictly a common-law requirement of running, because the common law did not concern itself with the state of the successor's conscience. It operates instead through the recording acts: an unrecorded covenant is void as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice under every American recording statute, so that in practice notice is indispensable to the enforcement of any servitude against a purchaser.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley.

Intent

Intent concerns whom the original parties meant to bind and benefit. In Runyon v. Paley, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the deed, the nature of the restrictions, and the circumstances of the transaction.

Intent is most often litigated where the instrument is silent or ambiguous. A covenant contained in a subdivision declaration recorded before any lot is sold, running to "each and every lot," plainly evidences intent. A covenant in a single deed, phrased as a personal promise by the named grantee to the named grantor, may not. Courts look to whether the covenanting parties owned neighbouring land capable of being benefited, whether the covenant is of a kind ordinarily meant to endure, whether it was recorded, and whether a scheme of similar covenants exists. A covenant of a manifestly personal character — that the grantor may continue to stable his horse on the premises during his life — will not be construed to bind successors however the instrument is worded.

A distinct problem arises where the benefit is intended to be held in gross. Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons in New Jersey refused to enforce against a successor a covenant reserving to the grantor the right to build any dwelling later erected on the lot, reasoning both that the covenant did not touch and concern the burdened land in any adequate sense and that the benefit, being personal to a builder who retained no neighbouring land, gave the covenant the character of a commercial arrangement rather than a land-use plan. Restatement (Third) § 2.6 reverses the classical hostility and permits benefits in gross to run; conservation easements and utility covenants, statutory in most states, depend upon that reversal.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley.

Writing and the Statute of Frauds

A covenant running with land is an interest in land within § 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677), and its American successors. The writing must identify the burdened and benefited land with reasonable certainty, state the substance of the obligation, and be signed by the party to be charged. In the ordinary conveyance the deed is signed by the grantor alone; the grantee who accepts the deed is bound by covenants it contains, on the theory that acceptance is an adoption of the instrument. Where the covenant is imposed by a subdivision declaration, the declaration signed by the developer and recorded before the sale of lots binds each purchaser who takes with record notice.

Three qualifications matter. First, the doctrine of part performance and the doctrine of estoppel may support enforcement of an oral restriction where a purchaser has substantially relied — Restatement (Third) § 2.9 recognizes servitudes by estoppel — but reliance must be substantial and referable to the promise. Second, the equitable servitude implied from a common plan is a recognized exception: reciprocal obligations are imposed on lots whose deeds contain no restriction at all, the writing requirement being satisfied by the recorded plat, the declaration, or the pattern of restricted deeds from the common grantor. Third, in registered-title systems and under the Torrens acts, an unregistered restriction is generally ineffective against a registered proprietor regardless of notice.

Sources: N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-703; Runyon v. Paley; Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677).

Touch and Concern

The requirement that a covenant touch and concern the land is the oldest of the running requirements after intent, the least susceptible of precise statement, and the one the Restatement (Third) has abolished. Its function is to distinguish obligations that are genuinely about land from obligations that merely happen to be undertaken by a landowner. Bigelow's classical test, adopted in Neponsit, asks whether the covenant alters the legal relations of the parties as landowners: if performance or forbearance renders the burdened land less valuable or the benefited land more valuable, in their character as land, the covenant touches and concerns.

Negative covenants restricting use present no difficulty; a prohibition on commercial activity plainly diminishes the burdened parcel and enhances the neighbours'. Affirmative covenants have been the battleground. Neponsit Property Owners' Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank in 1938 sustained a covenant to pay an annual assessment to a property owners' association for the maintenance of roads, paths, parks, and beaches, holding that the burden touched and concerned because the payment supported facilities essential to the enjoyment of the burdened lot, and that the association, though owning no land, could enforce as the agent of the lot owners in whom the benefit was vested. The opinion is the foundation of American common-interest community law. Eagle Enterprises v. Gross, by contrast, refused to enforce against a successor a covenant to accept and pay for seasonal water supplied by the grantor, holding that the obligation was in substance a personal commercial contract for the sale of a commodity, terminable and unrelated to the use of the land as land.

A related question is whether the benefit and the burden must both touch and concern for either to run. The classical answer, associated with the Restatement (First) § 537 and with Clark's monograph, is that the burden will not run at law unless the benefit also touches and concerns land — a rule that defeats commercial covenants benefiting a person rather than a parcel. Massachusetts abandoned the rule for anticompetitive covenants in Whitinsville Plaza v. Kotseas, and New Jersey in Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons replaced touch and concern altogether with a multi-factor reasonableness inquiry considering the intention of the parties, the reasonableness of the restriction's duration and area, the impact on competition and on the public interest, and whether the covenant was bargained for at arm's length.

The Restatement (Third) § 3.1 adopts the same solution generally: a servitude is valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or contrary to public policy, and § 3.1 comment b explains that touch and concern is superseded because it functioned as an inarticulate proxy for the policy judgments the section now makes explicit — invalidating unreasonable restraints on alienation (§ 3.4), unreasonable restraints on trade (§ 3.6), and servitudes that are unconscionable (§ 3.7) or that lack any rational justification. Practitioners in jurisdictions that retain touch and concern should nonetheless plead and prove it; the safest drafting states expressly the land-related purpose the covenant serves.

Sources: Neponsit Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank; Runyon v. Paley; Eagle Enterprises v. Gross.

Horizontal Privity

Horizontal privity concerns the relationship between the original parties when the covenant was made. Check whether the jurisdiction requires it and what relationship qualifies. A covenant made in connection with a conveyance and a standalone agreement between neighbors may be treated differently under the applicable rule.

The consequence of the prevailing rule is a drafting trap of great practical importance. Neighbours who covenant with one another by a separate written agreement, however carefully drawn and duly recorded, create no horizontal privity in a jurisdiction requiring it, and the burden of their covenant will not run at law. The same neighbours can achieve the result indirectly by conveying to a straw and taking back a deed containing the covenant, a device courts have long tolerated as satisfying the letter of the requirement while emptying it of function. Because equity requires no horizontal privity at all, the covenant will nonetheless be enforceable by injunction against successors with notice, and it is that circumstance, more than any argument of principle, that has discredited the requirement.

Restatement (Third) § 2.4 states flatly that no privity relationship between the parties is necessary to create a servitude, and comment b explains that the requirement served no function that recording and notice do not serve better. A significant number of American jurisdictions have followed, either by decision or by statute; others retain the requirement in name while satisfying it through the deed-conveyance formula. Counsel drafting neighbour-to-neighbour covenants should assume the strictest rule and structure the transaction accordingly.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley; Rhone v. Stephens.

Vertical Privity

Vertical privity concerns succession to a covenanting party’s estate. Runyon v. Paley examined succession on both sides of the covenant under North Carolina law. When a party holds a lease or a lesser estate, check the governing law separately for enforcement of the benefit, liability for the burden, and available equitable relief.

Equity dispenses with vertical privity entirely. Because the equitable servitude burdens the land itself and binds all who take with notice, it reaches lessees, licensees, life tenants, mortgagees in possession, and adverse possessors alike. The practical importance is considerable: a residential restriction is enforceable against the tenant who operates a business on the premises, though the tenant holds no estate the covenantor ever held, and against the squatter whose possession has ripened into title, though he is no one's successor at all.

The classical privity matrix
RequirementBurden at lawBenefit at lawEquity (burden or benefit)
Writing (Statute of Frauds)RequiredRequiredRequired, subject to common-plan implication and estoppel
Intent that the promise runRequiredRequiredRequired
Touch and concernRequired (abolished by Restatement (Third) § 3.1)RequiredRequired (same abolition)
Horizontal privityRequired in most jurisdictionsNot requiredNot required
Vertical privityStrict — succession to the entire estateRelaxed — succession to any interestNot required
NoticeNot an element, but supplied by recording actsNot applicableEssential
RemedyDamagesDamagesInjunction; damages in lieu at equity's discretion

Restatement (Third) §§ 5.1–5.9 replaces vertical privity with a functional distinction between negative and affirmative covenants. The burden of a negative covenant runs to every subsequent possessor of the burdened land, whatever the quality of the possession (§ 5.2); the burden of an affirmative covenant runs to persons who succeed to estates of the same duration as the estate held by the original covenantor, with lessees liable for obligations more reasonably performed by the occupant and life tenants liable to the extent of the value of their interest (§ 5.3). The reform substitutes a rule keyed to who can sensibly perform for a rule keyed to conveyancing formality.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley.

The Running of the Benefit

The benefit runs on easier terms than the burden, and for a reason of principle: the running of the benefit enlarges the class of persons who may enforce an obligation the defendant's predecessor voluntarily assumed, whereas the running of the burden imposes an obligation on a person who assumed nothing. No horizontal privity is required for the benefit at law; relaxed vertical privity suffices; and the benefit must touch and concern the land of the plaintiff. Where the covenant was made for the benefit of a defined tract, every successor to any part of that tract may enforce, unless the instrument provides otherwise.

Three questions of standing recur. The first is whether a covenantee who has parted with all benefited land may still enforce; the answer at common law is no, for the benefit was annexed to the land and departed with it, though the covenantee may retain a contract action against the original covenantor. London County Council v. Allen states the equitable rule to the same effect. The second is whether an association owning no land may enforce; Neponsit answered yes, treating the association as the agent or representative of the lot owners, and modern statutes now confer standing directly. Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 3-102(a)(4). The third is whether a municipality or a conservation organization may hold a benefit in gross; the classical answer was no, the modern answer, under Restatement (Third) § 2.6 and the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, is yes.

Where lots in a common scheme are successively conveyed, the direction of enforcement must be analyzed carefully. The developer's covenant with the first purchaser plainly benefits the developer's retained land, and successors to any part of that retained land may enforce against the first purchaser. Whether the first purchaser may enforce against a later purchaser is a different question, answered affirmatively by the common-plan doctrine on the theory that the developer impliedly promised the first purchaser that the remaining lots would be similarly restricted, and answered affirmatively in some jurisdictions on a third-party-beneficiary theory instead. The distinction matters where the plan is imperfectly implemented.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley; Neponsit Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank; London County Council v. Allen; Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (model act); Uniform Conservation Easement Act (model act).

Notice: Actual, Constructive, and Inquiry

A successor’s notice can matter to equitable enforcement and recording priority. Actual knowledge, record notice, and a duty to inquire involve different facts. Determine which rules apply and whether the restriction otherwise binds the property.

  • Actual notice. Knowledge in fact of the restriction, however acquired — from the vendor, from a neighbour, from the title report, from a prior transaction. Moxhay himself admitted actual notice.
  • Constructive or record notice. Notice imputed by law from the public records. A restriction contained in a recorded deed or declaration within the purchaser's chain of title charges him whether or not he searched. The scope of the chain of title is therefore critical, and jurisdictions differ on whether restrictions in deeds out from a common grantor to other lots are within it: Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall holds that they are; Witter v. Taggart holds that a deed out of the chain imparts no notice.
  • Inquiry notice. Notice charged where the visible state of the land or of the neighbourhood would put a reasonable purchaser upon inquiry. A uniform street of detached single-family houses on uniformly set-back lots gives notice of a residential scheme; a recital in the purchaser's own deed referring to a declaration recorded elsewhere requires him to find and read it. Sanborn v. McLean is the leading case, charging a purchaser with inquiry notice of a reciprocal negative easement from the character of the surrounding development.

A purchaser for value who takes without any form of notice takes free of the servitude, and the servitude is thereafter unenforceable against him and, in most jurisdictions, against his successors, even successors with notice, under the shelter rule. Because the consequence is destruction of the restriction as to that parcel, careful practice records restrictions in a declaration referenced in every deed, indexes them against every lot, and includes them verbatim or by specific reference in the conveyance itself.

Sources: Witter v. Taggart; Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall; N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291.

Common Schemes, General Plans, and Implied Reciprocal Servitudes

The subdivision developer conveys lots one at a time over a period of years. If each deed contains the restrictions, the burden on each lot is express and the only difficulty is the identification of the benefited parcels. But developers are imperfect, and deeds are omitted, mislaid, or deliberately unrestricted. The common-plan doctrine supplies the omission. Where a developer manifests a general plan or scheme of development for a defined tract, the restrictions of that plan may be implied against lots conveyed without express restriction, and every lot owner within the scheme may enforce against every other.

Sanborn v. McLean states the American doctrine. A developer of a Detroit subdivision conveyed most lots by deeds containing residential restrictions; the McLeans' lot had been conveyed without them. When the McLeans began to build a filling station in the rear of their lot, the neighbours obtained an injunction. The Michigan court reasoned that when the developer sold the first restricted lot, a reciprocal negative easement arose at once, fastening upon the lots he retained for the benefit of the lot sold; the easement attached to the McLeans' lot before it left the developer's hands, and the McLeans, whose surroundings were uniformly residential and whose abstract disclosed the pattern, were chargeable with inquiry notice.

The doctrine has four elements. First, a common grantor. Second, a plan or scheme in existence at the time the first restricted lot was conveyed; a scheme conceived later cannot bind lots already conveyed, and this temporal requirement is the doctrine's chief limitation. Third, a defined area to which the plan applies, so that the burdened and benefited parcels are ascertainable; Evans v. Pollock holds that the restricted area may be a definable portion of a larger tract rather than the whole. Fourth, notice, in one of its three forms, to the owner sought to be bound.

Evidence of a scheme is drawn from a recorded plat showing uniform lot lines and setbacks, a recorded declaration of restrictions, a substantial pattern of similarly restricted deeds, representations in sales brochures and by sales agents, and the physical uniformity of the completed development. Snow v. Van Dam supplies the classical Massachusetts analysis, holding that the scheme must be sufficiently uniform and comprehensive that purchasers reasonably understood themselves to be acquiring rights against the whole tract, and that the plan must have covered the parcel in question when the plaintiff's lot was sold.

Restatement (Third) §§ 2.11–2.14 restates the doctrine in modern form. Section 2.14 provides that a general-plan servitude is implied where the plan indicates that the burdened lot was intended to be covered, and § 2.12 supplies the criteria for inferring the plan from the developer's conduct, from a recorded plat or declaration, and from the pattern of conveyances. The Restatement treats the implied servitude as a servitude created by implication rather than as an exception to the Statute of Frauds, which is the more coherent characterization.

Sources: Sanborn v. McLean; Evans v. Pollock; Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall.

Affirmative Covenants, Assessments, and Homeowners' Associations

An affirmative covenant requires an act, such as repair or payment. Rhone v. Stephens illustrates the English rule applied to a positive freehold covenant. Neponsit illustrates a different question under New York law involving a shared-expense assessment.

American law took the opposite path, and the affirmative covenant to pay assessments is now the most economically significant servitude in the country. Neponsit sustained the assessment covenant on three grounds: that the assessment funded facilities without which the burdened lot could not be enjoyed as intended, so that the burden touched and concerned; that the covenant created an equitable lien on the lot, enforceable in rem; and that the association, though landless, could sue as the representative of the owners in whom the benefit was vested. The doctrinal edifice of the modern homeowners' association rests on those three propositions.

Modern statutes have largely superseded the common-law analysis. The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act authorizes the declaration to impose assessments (§ 3-115), grants the association a statutory lien with priority over most encumbrances for a limited number of months of assessments (§ 3-116), and confers on the association the power to sue and be sued, to adopt rules, and to impose charges for late payment (§ 3-102). Davis–Stirling in California, chapter 720 of the Florida statutes, and chapter 209 of the Texas Property Code perform the same functions. These statutes supply what the common law could not: a standing entity, a lien remedy, a governance mechanism, and a body of procedural protection for the owner.

Judicial review of association restrictions and rules has become the central battleground. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association held that use restrictions recorded in the declaration are presumptively valid and enforceable unless they are wholly arbitrary, violate a fundamental public policy, or impose a burden on the use of the land that substantially outweighs the benefit — a deferential standard justified by the notice every purchaser has of the recorded declaration. Rules subsequently adopted by the board, not recorded and not bargained for, receive a stricter reasonableness review. Restatement (Third) § 6.7 and § 6.13 codify a comparable two-tier standard. Chapter 24 develops this material at length.

Sources: Neponsit Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank; Rhone v. Stephens; Cal. Civ. Code § 5975.

Restrictive Covenants: Interpretation, Scope, and Constitutional Limits

Restrictive covenants are construed, in the classical formulation, strictly against the party seeking enforcement and in favour of the free use of land, ambiguities being resolved against the restriction. The rule has softened. Restatement (Third) § 4.1 directs that a servitude be interpreted to carry out the purpose for which it was created, and many modern courts apply ordinary principles of instrument construction, giving effect to the evident intention of the parties without a thumb on the scale. Where a covenant is part of a comprehensive scheme in which every owner has reciprocal rights, courts construe it to effectuate the scheme, since strict construction would defeat the reasonable expectations of everyone in the development.

Recurring interpretive problems include the meaning of "residential purposes" as applied to home offices, day-care, group homes for the disabled, and short-term vacation rental; the meaning of "single family" as applied to unrelated occupants; the scope of architectural-approval clauses and the standard of review of a committee's decision; and the effect of a term of years with automatic renewal unless a stated majority objects. Statutory overlays are pervasive: the Fair Housing Amendments Act requires reasonable accommodation and preempts restrictions excluding group homes for persons with disabilities, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3); many states preempt covenants prohibiting solar collectors, clotheslines, political signs, flags, xeriscaping, electric-vehicle charging, and accessory dwelling units.

The constitutional limit is absolute where race is concerned. Shelley v. Kraemer held that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant is state action denying equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; Barrows v. Jackson extended the holding to actions for damages against a covenantor who breached; and the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 independently prohibit such covenants. Restatement (Third) § 3.1(1) states that a servitude is invalid if it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy. Many states now provide a summary administrative procedure by which an owner may strike the offending language from the record, though the historical instrument itself is preserved for the archive; the covenants remain in millions of American chains of title as a matter of record and are wholly void as a matter of law.

Sources: Shelley v. Kraemer; Barrows v. Jackson; Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn.; 42 U.S.C. § 3604; 42 U.S.C. § 1982.

Enforcement: Damages and Injunction

Identify the restriction, the claimant’s right to enforce it, the defendant’s relationship to the burdened land, and the relief sought. In Runyon v. Paley, the North Carolina Supreme Court distinguished damages on a covenant running at law from equitable enforcement. It separately examined whether the parties seeking an injunction could establish the requirements for an equitable servitude.

For an injunction, establish the applicable equitable standard and address any defenses. For damages, identify the authorized measure and evidence of loss. In a common-interest development, check the declaration and statutes. For example, Cal. Civ. Code § 5975 provides for enforcement of covered governing documents and addresses attorney’s fees and costs.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley; Cal. Civ. Code § 5975.

Modification and Termination: Changed Conditions

The doctrine of changed conditions permits a court to refuse enforcement of a servitude, and under the modern rule to modify or terminate it, where changes in the character of the neighbourhood have rendered the servitude's purpose incapable of substantial achievement. The doctrine is narrow, and the cases that state it most clearly are the cases refusing to apply it.

Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski is the standard authority. A 1941 subdivision restricted to single-family residences was, by 1969, surrounded by commercial development on a heavily travelled arterial street; the developer sought to build a shopping centre on a retained parcel within the tract. The Nevada court refused, holding that the restriction retained substantial value to the interior lot owners, that the tract itself remained wholly residential, and that changes outside the subdivision — however dramatic — do not terminate a restriction so long as the original purpose can still be realized within it. El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach illustrates the opposite result: a covenant prohibiting the sale of alcohol in a beach town was terminated where the town had become a commercial resort in which alcohol was consumed openly in every restaurant by patrons bringing their own, so that enforcement served no purpose the covenant was designed to serve.

Restatement (Third) § 7.10 states the modern rule in terms of modification rather than mere non-enforcement: when a change in conditions makes it impossible as a practical matter to accomplish the purpose for which the servitude was created, a court may modify the servitude to permit its purpose to be accomplished, and if modification is not practicable or would not be effective, may terminate it. Compensation to the beneficiaries may be ordered as a condition of modification or termination. The Restatement's approach is superior to the all-or-nothing common-law rule because it allows the court to preserve as much of the original arrangement as circumstances permit.

Statutory analogues are widespread and often more useful than the common-law doctrine. Section 84 of the English Law of Property Act, 1925, empowers the Upper Tribunal to discharge or modify restrictions that are obsolete, that impede reasonable user, or to which the beneficiaries have agreed, with compensation. New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1951 authorizes extinguishment of a restriction of no actual and substantial benefit. Massachusetts limits enforcement of restrictions more than thirty years old to cases in which the restriction is of actual and substantial benefit, and Florida's and other marketable-title acts extinguish restrictions not preserved by a recorded notice within the statutory period.

Sources: Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski; El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach; N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951; Law of Property Act 1925, § 84; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 30; Fla. Stat. §§ 712.01–712.12.

Waiver, Abandonment, Acquiescence, Estoppel, Laches, and Unclean Hands

The equitable defences overlap in the cases and are frequently pleaded together, but they are analytically distinct and differ in scope. The essential question is always whether the defence defeats enforcement by the particular plaintiff against the particular defendant, or destroys the servitude as to the whole scheme.

  • Waiver. The intentional relinquishment of a known right, ordinarily personal to the party who waives and effective only as to the violation waived.
  • Acquiescence. Failure to object to a particular violation, barring enforcement against that violator, and barring enforcement of the same restriction against others only where the pattern of tolerated violations is so general that the restriction has ceased to serve its purpose.
  • Abandonment. A general and substantial disregard of the restriction throughout the tract, so extensive that the scheme has been destroyed and no owner can reasonably expect its benefits. Abandonment terminates the servitude as to all; isolated or peripheral violations do not abandon. Restatement (Third) § 7.4.
  • Estoppel. Conduct by the beneficiary inducing the burdened owner reasonably to rely to his detriment — typically an assurance that the restriction would not be enforced, followed by substantial expenditure. Restatement (Third) § 7.6.
  • Laches. Unreasonable delay in seeking relief, causing prejudice. A plaintiff who watches a building rise for six months and sues at completion will ordinarily be confined to damages.
  • Unclean hands. Violation of the same restriction by the plaintiff, denying him equitable relief while leaving his action at law intact.
  • Relative hardship. Not a defence to the servitude's validity but a ground for withholding the injunction and awarding damages where enforcement would be grossly disproportionate.

The distinction between acquiescence and abandonment is worked in the cases through counting: courts examine the number, visibility, location, and character of the violations, whether they are of the same restriction sought to be enforced, and whether the overall character of the tract has changed. Toleration of six detached garages in setback areas does not abandon a single-family restriction; toleration of nine commercial establishments on a subdivision's principal street may abandon the residential character of that street while leaving the interior scheme intact — a partial abandonment courts increasingly recognize.

Sources: Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski; El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach.

Merger, Release, Expiration, Condemnation, and Statutory Termination

A servitude terminates by merger when the burdened and benefited estates come into the same ownership in the same right and in fee. Merger is rarely complete in a subdivision, because the benefit is vested in every lot owner and unity of all lots is practically impossible; a developer who reacquires two of four hundred lots extinguishes nothing. Where merger does occur, the servitude does not revive on subsequent severance and must be expressly recreated.

Release is the ordinary voluntary termination, requiring a writing executed by every person in whom the benefit is vested and recorded in the burdened lot's chain. In a common scheme this means every lot owner, and the practical impossibility of unanimity is precisely why modern declarations provide amendment procedures by supermajority vote, and why statutes supply default amendment mechanisms. Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 2-117 permits amendment by sixty-seven percent of the votes unless the declaration specifies a different figure, subject to protections for particular classes of provision.

A servitude may expire by its own terms, where the instrument fixes a term of years or provides for automatic renewal subject to termination by a stated majority. Condemnation of the burdened land extinguishes the servitude to the extent of the taking, and in most jurisdictions the holders of the benefit are entitled to compensation for the value of the restriction taken — a proposition on which jurisdictions divide, some treating the restriction as a compensable property interest and others as a mere contract right. Prescription may extinguish a servitude where an open, notorious, adverse, and continuous violation continues for the prescriptive period, though the doctrine is applied narrowly to negative restrictions.

Statutory termination is now the most important mode in practice. Marketable-title acts extinguish restrictions not preserved by a recorded notice within the statutory period measured from the root of title, subject to savings clauses that in some states swallow the rule. Fla. Stat. §§ 712.01–712.12. Ancient-restriction statutes limit enforcement of restrictions after a fixed period unless they confer actual and substantial benefit, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 30, and Minn. Stat. § 500.20 terminates most restrictions after thirty years. Counsel examining title must consult the situs statute; the age of a restriction is never, without more, a ground for disregarding it.

Sources: N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951; Fla. Stat. §§ 712.01–712.12; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 30; Minn. Stat. § 500.20.

Recording, Notice, and Title Examination

Check the recording statute, the purchaser’s status, and the chain of title before deciding whether an unrecorded restriction binds a purchaser. New York Real Property Law § 291 supplies a jurisdiction-specific recording example. For a development, use the applicable recording and indexing procedures for the declaration and amendments and check how the records identify each affected parcel.

The examiner's task is to identify every restriction affecting the parcel, which requires searching the grantor index against every predecessor in title for the period of each one's ownership, examining the recorded plat and any declaration referenced in it, and — in jurisdictions following Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall — examining deeds out from common grantors to other parcels in the tract. In jurisdictions following Witter v. Taggart, restrictions imposed by a deed out to another parcel are outside the chain and impart no constructive notice, but the examiner must still consider whether the physical character of the neighbourhood creates inquiry notice.

Curative practice includes obtaining releases or partial releases from benefited owners, recording an amendment adopted under the declaration's amendment clause, obtaining a declaratory judgment or quiet-title decree adjudicating the restriction unenforceable, invoking a marketable-title or ancient-restriction statute by recorded affidavit, and — for racially restrictive language — invoking the summary redaction procedures now available in many states. Title insurers ordinarily except restrictions of record from coverage and will insure against forfeiture or reversion for violation only on a satisfactory survey and estoppel from the association.

Sources: N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291; Witter v. Taggart; Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall.

The Restatement (Third) Approach and Modern Statutory Developments

The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, approved by the American Law Institute in 2000 under the reportership of Susan F. French, is the most thorough reconstruction of a field of American property law attempted by the Institute. Its central move is definitional. A servitude is a legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs with land, and the classical categories — easement, profit, real covenant, equitable servitude — are treated as varieties of a single institution governed by one set of rules of creation, interpretation, succession, and termination.

  • Terminology. §§ 1.1–1.4 collapse the real covenant and the equitable servitude into the single category of a covenant running with land, retaining the easement and profit as the categories of rights of use and removal.
  • Privity abolished. § 2.4 provides that no privity relationship is required to create a servitude, and §§ 5.1–5.9 substitute functional rules of succession for vertical privity.
  • Touch and concern superseded. § 3.1 provides that a servitude is valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or contrary to public policy, and §§ 3.4–3.7 identify the specific policies — restraints on alienation, restraints on trade, unconscionability — that the touch-and-concern requirement formerly served indirectly.
  • Benefits in gross. § 2.6 permits servitude benefits to be held in gross and to be transferred, validating conservation servitudes, utility covenants, and association-held benefits.
  • General plans. §§ 2.11–2.14 codify the implication of reciprocal servitudes from a general plan of development.
  • Common-interest communities. Chapter 6 supplies a complete framework of association powers, member protections, and standards of review — the first Restatement treatment of the subject.
  • Modification and termination. §§ 7.1–7.15 collect release, abandonment, merger, prescription, estoppel, condemnation, marketable-title extinguishment, and the changed-conditions power of § 7.10, which authorizes modification as well as termination and permits compensation.
  • Remedies. §§ 8.1–8.5 make legal and equitable relief available for breach of any servitude, subject to ordinary equitable discretion.

Adoption has been uneven. Several state supreme courts have expressly embraced the abolition of touch and concern or of horizontal privity; others cite the Restatement for interpretive propositions while retaining the classical elements; a few have declined it as a legislative rather than judicial reform. The practical consequence is that counsel must plead in the alternative, satisfying both the classical elements and the Restatement's validity standard, and must draft as though the strictest rule applies.

Legislation has moved faster than case law. The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act and its predecessors govern the creation and operation of condominiums and planned communities in a majority of states; the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, adopted in most states, dispenses with touch and concern, privity, and the requirement of a benefited parcel for conservation servitudes; marketable-title and ancient-restriction acts impose temporal limits; and preemption statutes disable covenants restricting solar collectors, political expression, group homes, accessory dwellings, and manufactured housing. The modern law of promissory servitudes is therefore statutory at its centre and common-law only at its margins.

Sources: Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (publisher record); Cal. Civ. Code § 5975.

Comparative Analysis

The five private land-use devices examined in Part VII may be compared directly. The table states the classical common-law position; the Restatement (Third) unifies the first four into a single law of servitudes and would answer several of the rows differently.

Easement, profit, real covenant, equitable servitude, and licence compared
FeatureEasement / ProfitReal covenantEquitable servitudeLicence
Juridical natureConveyance of an interest in landPromise annexed to an estatePromise burdening land in equityPermission; no interest in land
FormalityWriting; implication; prescriptionWriting requiredWriting or implication from a general planNone; may be oral
Binds successorsYes, as a property interestYes, if privity and touch and concern are satisfiedYes, against anyone taking with noticeNo; revocable at will
Privity requiredNoneHorizontal and strict vertical for the burdenNoneNot applicable
Notice requiredFor priority under the recording actsFor priority under the recording actsEssential elementNot applicable
Typical remedyInjunction, damages, ejectment for surchargeDamagesInjunctionNone against the licensor; trespass upon revocation
Affirmative obligationsRare; maintenance duties by agreementYes in America; no in EnglandYes in America; no in EnglandNot applicable
Termination by changed conditionsRarely; easements are durableYesYes — the doctrine's homeNot applicable

Comparative systems avoid the Anglo-American difficulty by structural means. German law recognizes the Grunddienstbarkeit for negative and use servitudes and the Reallast for recurring affirmative burdens, both entered in the Grundbuch, so that the register rather than the doctrine of notice determines enforceability; the numerus clausus limits the permissible forms and the register makes them discoverable. French law relies on servitudes réelles under articles 637 to 710 of the Code civil and hesitates over affirmative obligations, resolving common-ownership problems through the statutory copropriété regime rather than through private covenant. English law, having refused to let positive burdens run, achieved the same result through leasehold, the estate rentcharge, and finally the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act, 2002. In each system the functional demand — enforceable, discoverable, long-term private land-use planning — is met; the American solution is distinctive in meeting it through judge-made servitude doctrine supplemented by recording.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley; Tulk v. Moxhay; Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (publisher record).

Practical Applications

Sources: Runyon v. Paley; Sanborn v. McLean; El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach; Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall; 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

Common Misconceptions

  1. "A real covenant and an equitable servitude are two different promises." They are ordinarily one promise viewed through two remedial lenses. The elements differ because the forums differed, not because the transactions differ.
  2. "If the covenant does not run at law, it is unenforceable against successors." It remains enforceable in equity against anyone taking with notice, which in practice means almost every purchaser.
  3. "Tulk v. Moxhay held that contracts bind purchasers with notice." The early reasoning suggested as much, but the doctrine was confined within a generation: the plaintiff must hold benefited land, and (in England) the covenant must be negative.
  4. "The words 'heirs and assigns' are required." They are strong evidence of intent, not a formal requisite. Restatement (Third) § 2.2 permits intent to be shown by circumstances and purpose.
  5. "Horizontal privity means the parties are neighbours." It means a relationship respecting the land independent of the covenant — almost always grantor and grantee in the deed containing it. Neighbours who covenant by separate agreement have none.
  6. "A tenant cannot be bound by a covenant made by his landlord's predecessor." A tenant’s obligations depend on the lease, the restriction, the jurisdiction’s successor rules, and the remedy sought. Notice is one part of the analysis.
  7. "Affirmative covenants never run." True in England; false in the United States, where the assessment covenant sustained in Neponsit is the financial foundation of every homeowners' association.
  8. "A restriction omitted from a deed cannot bind that lot." Where a common plan existed at the first conveyance and the purchaser had notice, reciprocal servitudes may be implied. Sanborn v. McLean.
  9. "Commercial development around a subdivision terminates its restrictions." Change outside the tract is generally irrelevant while the interior retains its restricted character. Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski.
  10. "One tolerated violation waives the restriction for everyone." Acquiescence bars enforcement against the violator; abandonment requires general and substantial disregard of the same restriction throughout the tract.
  11. "A single objecting owner cannot stop a development." Whether one owner can obtain an injunction depends on the right to enforce the restriction, applicable defenses, and the governing standard for relief.
  12. "Old restrictions expire automatically." Only under a statute. Marketable-title and ancient-restriction acts do the work, and their savings clauses frequently preserve what they appear to extinguish.
  13. "Racially restrictive covenants are merely unenforceable formalities to be ignored." They are void, their enforcement is unconstitutional, and their attempted enforcement violates federal statute; many states now provide a procedure for striking the language from the indexed record.
  14. "Merger extinguishes subdivision restrictions when the developer reacquires lots." Only unity of all benefited and burdened parcels in the same ownership and right will do, which in a subdivision is practically unattainable.
  15. "The Restatement (Third) is the law." It is persuasive secondary authority. Its abolition of privity and of touch and concern binds no court that has not adopted it, and counsel must satisfy the classical elements wherever they survive.

Sources: Runyon v. Paley; Witter v. Taggart; Shelley v. Kraemer.

Chapter Summary

Enforcement against a successor depends on the instrument, the governing jurisdiction, and the theory and remedy asserted. Runyon v. Paley distinguishes damages on a covenant running at law from enforcement of an equitable servitude.

The requirements for running burdens and benefits, and the relevance of notice, depend on the governing jurisdiction and theory of enforcement. A title review should identify the affected land, the source of the claimed restriction, the parties entitled to enforce it, and any recording or priority issues.

Where a developer manifests a general plan for a defined tract before the first conveyance, reciprocal negative servitudes may be implied against lots conveyed without express restriction, and every owner within the scheme may enforce against every other. That doctrine, together with the American willingness to let the burden of affirmative covenants run, made the restricted subdivision possible, and the assessment covenant sustained in Neponsit made the homeowners' association possible. Restrictions are construed to effectuate their purpose, are subject to pervasive statutory preemption, and are absolutely void where they discriminate by race.

Enforcement is by damages, by injunction, or by both. Injunctive relief depends on the governing equitable standard and any applicable defenses. Servitudes are modified or terminated by changed conditions where the original purpose can no longer be substantially achieved, and by release, merger, expiration, abandonment, prescription, estoppel, condemnation, and an increasingly important body of marketable-title and ancient-restriction legislation. Recording governs everything: the restriction that is not discoverable is not durable.

The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes unified the field in 2000, abolishing privity, superseding touch and concern with a direct public-policy test of validity, permitting benefits in gross, codifying general-plan implication, and making the full range of remedies available for any servitude. Adoption is partial, and the practitioner must know both the classical elements and the modern framework.

Chapters 21, 22, and 23 have now established the three foundational private servitudes: the right to use, the right to take, and the promise respecting use. Chapter 24 turns to their institutional application. In the condominium, the planned community, the cooperative, and the homeowners' association, easements over common areas, profits in shared resources, affirmative covenants to pay assessments, and restrictive covenants governing conduct operate together as a single integrated system of private land-use governance, administered by a corporate body with power to legislate, to tax, and to enforce. The doctrines examined in this Part are the raw materials; the common-interest community is what has been built from them.

Further Reading

  • Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §§ 1.1–1.4, 2.1–2.14, 3.1–3.7, 4.1–4.10, 5.1–5.9, 7.1–7.15, 8.1–8.5 (Am. L. Inst. 2000).
  • Restatement (First) of Property §§ 530–555 (1944) — the classical statement of real covenants.
  • Charles E. Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run with Land" (2d ed. 1947).
  • Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261 (1982).
  • Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1177 (1982).
  • Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353 (1982).
  • Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 167 (1970).
  • 9 Powell on Real Property §§ 60.01–60.11 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.).
  • 2 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The Law of Real Property §§ 848–866 (3d ed. 1939).
  • Gerald Korngold, Private Land Use Arrangements: Easements, Real Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes (2d ed. 2004).
  • A. W. B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law 116–120, 256–260 (2d ed. 1986).
  • J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History chs. 6, 17 (5th ed. 2019).
  • Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (Unif. L. Comm'n 1982, as amended 2008).

Primary sources

Cross-references

Referenced By

Editorial metadata

First published
August 7, 2026

How to Cite This Chapter

The Real Law Society Editorial Board, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, Real Law Society Press (August 7, 2026), https://reallawsociety.com/press/articles/real-covenants-and-equitable-servitudes-second-edition.

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