The Trustee's Duty of Impartiality

1. The duty of impartiality requires the trustee, when the trust has two or more beneficiaries, to administer the trust with due regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests. UTC § 803; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 79.
2. Impartiality is not equality. It requires equitable treatment consistent with the trust's terms and purposes, not identical treatment of every beneficiary.
3. Impartiality is a companion to, and analytically distinct from, the duty of loyalty. Loyalty asks whose interests the trustee serves; impartiality regulates how the trustee balances the several interests she is bound to serve.
4. The duty applies across every axis of beneficiary division: current versus remainder, income versus principal, mandatory versus discretionary, and among concurrent beneficiaries of the same class.
5. The settlor's expressed preferences may lawfully tilt the balance toward one beneficiary or class. Where the trust instrument reflects such a preference, impartiality requires the trustee to honor it rather than to override it in the name of even-handedness.
6. Absent such a preference, the trustee must give due regard to the respective interests of all beneficiaries; she may not systematically favor one class at the expense of another.
7. Allocation of receipts and disbursements between principal and income is governed by the trust instrument and, where the instrument is silent, by the Uniform Principal and Income Act or its state analogue.
8. Investment decisions must consider the trust's investment horizon in light of the interests of both current and remainder beneficiaries; a portfolio skewed toward current yield at the expense of long-term growth (or the reverse) may breach the duty.
9. In discretionary trusts, impartiality shapes but does not eliminate the trustee's discretion; the trustee must exercise discretion in good faith and with due regard to the interests of all beneficiaries whose interests are affected.
10. Remedies for breach of impartiality include surcharge, adjustment between principal and income accounts, injunction, and, in serious cases, removal of the trustee. UTC §§ 706, 1001–1002.

Upon completing this chapter, the reader should be able to:

1. State the doctrinal content of the duty of impartiality under UTC § 803 and Restatement (Third) § 79.
2. Distinguish impartiality from equality and articulate why the two are not the same.
3. Explain the doctrinal relationship between impartiality and the duty of loyalty.
4. Identify the principal axes along which beneficiary interests may diverge and analyze how impartiality operates on each.
5. Apply the concept of due regard to a fact pattern involving competing beneficiary interests.
6. Evaluate the effect of the settlor's expressed preferences on the trustee's duty of impartiality.
7. Analyze allocation of receipts and disbursements under the Uniform Principal and Income Act.
8. Assess an investment or distribution decision under the duty of impartiality.
9. Identify remedies available for breach of impartiality and select the appropriate remedy on a given fact pattern.
10. Diagnose common misconceptions concerning impartiality — most importantly the equation of impartiality with equality.

• Uniform Trust Code § 803 (duty of impartiality); § 802 (duty of loyalty); § 105 (default and mandatory rules); § 706 (removal of trustee); § 814 (discretionary powers; tax savings); §§ 1001–1002 (remedies; damages).
• Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 79 (duty of impartiality), 78 (loyalty), 50 (discretionary interests), 100 (liability for breach), 227–228 (investment); § 232 (impartiality among beneficiaries in older Restatement usage).
• Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 (duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries); § 232 (allocation between income and principal).
• Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997, revised 2018 as the Uniform Fiduciary Income and Principal Act).
• Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2(c) (consideration of the needs of beneficiaries for income and preservation of capital).
• State statutory analogues: Cal. Prob. Code § 16003; Fla. Stat. § 736.0803; N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-2.3; Tex. Prop. Code § 117.008; Ohio Rev. Code § 5808.03; Va. Code § 64.2-765.
• Leading decisions: Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Nossaman's Estate, 61 Cal. 2d 630 (1964); Matter of Rowland, 273 A.D.2d 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Estate of Cooper, 913 P.2d 393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); In re Trust of Stuart Cochran Irrevocable Trust, 901 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

• Austin Wakeman Scott, William Franklin Fratcher & Mark L. Ascher, Scott and Ascher on Trusts (5th ed.) § 18 (duty of impartiality).
• George Gleason Bogert, George Taylor Bogert & Amy Morris Hess, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (3d ed. & Supp.) §§ 541, 612 (impartiality and allocation).
• Charles E. Rounds Jr. & Charles E. Rounds III, Loring and Rounds: A Trustee's Handbook, ch. 6 (duty of impartiality).
• Robert H. Sitkoff & Jesse Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates (11th ed.), chapter on impartiality and principal-and-income.
• Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College, University, and Foundation Decisions on Annual Spending from Endowments, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 49 (1993).
• Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2003).
• Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Reporter's Notes to § 79.
• ACTEC Commentaries on Trustee Fiduciary Duties (current edition).

Chapter 7 examined the duty of loyalty, which asks whose interests the trustee serves. The duty of impartiality, addressed in this chapter, asks a different question: when the trustee is bound to serve more than one beneficiary, how must she balance the several interests she is bound to serve. Loyalty answers the singular question; impartiality answers the plural one.

The duty is stated in UTC § 803: "If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 79 states the rule in Restatement form. Both formulations presuppose that the interests of the several beneficiaries may diverge and that the trustee, standing above the divergence, must administer the trust with due regard to each.

Impartiality is a substantive duty, not a temperament. It is not satisfied by an even-handed disposition or an absence of favoritism. It requires that every fiduciary act — investment, allocation, distribution, communication — be evaluated in light of the interests of all beneficiaries whose interests are affected, and that the trustee's decisions bear a rational and honorable relation to those interests as the trust's terms and purposes define them.

The most durable misconception about the duty of impartiality is that it requires equal treatment of every beneficiary. It does not. UTC § 803 cmt.; Restatement (Third) § 79 cmt. b. Impartiality requires the trustee to act with due regard for the beneficiaries' respective interests; those interests are defined by the trust instrument, and the trust instrument may, and typically does, create different interests for different beneficiaries.

A life tenant and a remainderman do not share the same interest in the trust. A current beneficiary entitled to mandatory income does not share the same interest as a discretionary beneficiary. A minor beneficiary whose support is a stated purpose of the trust does not share the same interest as an adult beneficiary whose entitlement is contingent on survivorship. To treat them identically would be to disregard the trust instrument; to treat them impartially is to give each what the instrument, read in light of its purposes, provides.

The distinction between equal treatment and equitable treatment is doctrinal, not stylistic. A trustee who divides every distribution equally among beneficiaries whose interests the instrument makes unequal violates the duty of impartiality as surely as one who systematically favors a single beneficiary. Impartiality is a rule of fidelity to the trust's design, not a rule of arithmetic.

Impartiality is a structural consequence of the trust relationship. Where the trust has multiple beneficiaries with divergent interests, the trustee occupies a position from which she alone can adjudicate — through the exercise of fiduciary judgment — how the trust's resources will bear upon those interests. That adjudicative position is the source of the duty. Because the beneficiaries cannot police one another, and because none of them controls the trust, the law demands that the person who does control it act with due regard to all.

The structural character of the duty explains why it applies uniformly to individual, professional, and corporate trustees; why it applies to trusts of every size and purpose; and why it cannot be discharged by acquiescence in one beneficiary's preference, even if that beneficiary is the most vocal, the most present, or the most sympathetic. Impartiality binds the office, not the personality.

The duty of impartiality is as old as the multi-beneficiary trust. Chancery long recognized that a trustee who preferred one beneficiary to another without warrant in the instrument acted contrary to equity. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 codified the rule in the mid-twentieth century: "When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them." The Restatement (Third) § 79 refines the formulation without altering the underlying principle.

The most consequential historical development has been the elaboration of impartiality along the principal-and-income axis. As the successive Uniform Principal and Income Acts (1931, 1962, 1997, and the 2018 revision as the Uniform Fiduciary Income and Principal Act) matured, they translated the general duty of impartiality into detailed rules of allocation. That translation reflects a doctrinal choice: the duty of impartiality, though general in form, is largely worked out through specific accounting rules and specific investment standards, not through freestanding balancing.

UTC § 803, adopted in 2000, provides the modern statutory statement of the duty. Its language is deliberately brief because the substantive content of impartiality is supplied by the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, and the trust instrument itself. UTC § 803 cmt. The duty stated in § 803 is thus the doctrinal umbrella under which more specific statutory duties are exercised.

State enactments follow the UTC closely. Cal. Prob. Code § 16003; Fla. Stat. § 736.0803; N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-2.3; Tex. Prop. Code § 117.008; Ohio Rev. Code § 5808.03; Va. Code § 64.2-765. Departures are marginal. The doctrinal core — due regard for the respective interests of the beneficiaries — is uniform in enacting jurisdictions.

Loyalty and impartiality are the two duties that most closely define the fiduciary posture. Loyalty forbids the trustee from serving any interest other than the beneficiaries'. Impartiality regulates the trustee's conduct when the beneficiaries whose interests she is loyally serving are more than one. The duties are complementary: impartiality without loyalty is neutrality in service of a stranger; loyalty without impartiality is fidelity that plays favorites.

The analytic separation is important because breach of one is not automatically breach of the other. A trustee who evenhandedly serves multiple beneficiaries but takes a hidden commission from a broker breaches loyalty, not impartiality. A trustee who serves the beneficiaries with unimpeachable loyalty but consistently prefers the income beneficiary over the remainderman breaches impartiality, not loyalty. The remedies, and the standards of proof, differ accordingly.

In practice, the duties often overlap. A trustee who favors a beneficiary who is also her relative may breach both — loyalty because the favor is influenced by an extraneous interest, and impartiality because the favor comes at the expense of another beneficiary. In such cases the pleading names both duties and the court analyzes each independently. The overlap does not merge the duties; it confirms that a single act may transgress more than one fiduciary boundary.

The duty of impartiality operates along several familiar axes. The four most consequential are: (i) current versus remainder beneficiaries; (ii) income versus principal beneficiaries; (iii) mandatory versus discretionary beneficiaries; and (iv) concurrent beneficiaries within the same class. Each axis is a familiar source of divergent interests, and each is a familiar occasion for allegations of partial administration.

The axes are not exhaustive. Vested and contingent beneficiaries, present and future takers, adult and minor beneficiaries, and beneficiaries subject to different distribution standards may all give rise to divergent interests. The doctrine adapts to the axis presented; the standard — due regard for the respective interests of the beneficiaries — is invariant.

Current beneficiaries have an immediate interest in the trust's productivity and distributions; remainder beneficiaries have an interest in the preservation and long-term growth of the corpus. Their interests are not opposed by nature — both benefit from a well-managed trust — but they diverge on questions of allocation and investment horizon. A trustee who invests exclusively for high current yield diminishes the remainderman's interest; a trustee who invests exclusively for long-term appreciation diminishes the current beneficiary's.

The doctrine responds through the total-return approach embodied in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Uniform Principal and Income Act. UPIA § 2(c) instructs the trustee to consider "the needs of the beneficiaries for income and preservation of capital." The Uniform Principal and Income Act permits the trustee, in defined circumstances, to adjust between principal and income accounts to give current beneficiaries a fair share of total return where investment strategy has produced growth rather than yield. UPIA § 104 (1997 Act). Together, these provisions operationalize the duty of impartiality along the current/remainder axis.

The income/principal distinction is often coextensive with the current/remainder distinction but not always. Where a trust divides income among several current beneficiaries and gives principal at termination to a different group, the trustee owes impartial administration to each set. Allocation questions — whether a receipt is income or principal, whether an expense is chargeable to income or principal — are resolved under the Uniform Principal and Income Act (or its 2018 revision, the Uniform Fiduciary Income and Principal Act) and the trust instrument.

The allocation rules are not merely accounting conventions. They are the mechanism by which the duty of impartiality is discharged in the ordinary course of administration. A trustee who systematically allocates receipts to income where the Act calls for principal, or vice versa, violates the duty of impartiality by shifting economic value between beneficiary classes without warrant. See infra Part VI.

Where the instrument creates both mandatory and discretionary interests — for example, mandatory income to a spouse and discretionary principal to descendants — impartiality still governs. The mandatory beneficiary is entitled to what the instrument prescribes; the discretionary beneficiary is entitled to good-faith exercise of discretion informed by the trust's purposes and the beneficiaries' circumstances. UTC § 814; Restatement (Third) § 50. Impartiality does not convert discretion into mandate, but it does forbid the trustee from exercising discretion in a manner that systematically prefers one class over another without doctrinal warrant.

Impartiality applies not only across classes but within a class. Where the trust names several current income beneficiaries in equal shares, the trustee may not favor one over the others in the timing, frequency, or form of distributions. Where the instrument permits unequal distributions within a class — as under a HEMS or comparable discretionary standard — impartiality requires that the discretion be exercised on grounds authorized by the instrument, not on grounds extraneous to it. See infra Part VIII.

The phrase "due regard" in UTC § 803 is the operative standard. It does not require equality; it does not require balance in any mathematical sense; it does not require that the trustee treat every beneficiary identically. It requires that the trustee, in every decision that affects the beneficiaries' interests, consider those interests and act in a manner that a reasonable and impartial fiduciary would approve.

Due regard is thus a duty of consideration and rationality. It obligates the trustee to identify the beneficiaries whose interests are at stake, to understand how a proposed action bears on each, and to select the course of action that gives each interest the weight the trust's terms and purposes require. Restatement (Third) § 79 cmt. b. It permits — indeed requires — different outcomes for beneficiaries whose interests differ; it forbids arbitrary or extraneous preference.

The settlor may lawfully direct that one beneficiary or class be favored over another. UTC § 803 cmt.; Restatement (Third) § 79 cmt. c. A precatory or mandatory direction to "provide for my spouse before my children," or to "invest primarily for the growth of the remainder," or to "distribute liberally to the current beneficiaries during their lifetimes," alters the balance the trustee must strike. Where the settlor has spoken, the trustee's duty of impartiality is discharged by faithful adherence to the settlor's preference, not by disregarding it in favor of formal even-handedness.

This is not an exception to impartiality; it is the doctrine correctly stated. Impartiality is measured against the interests of the beneficiaries as the trust instrument defines them. Where the instrument defines those interests as weighted, impartial administration weighs them accordingly. The trustee is not the settlor's equalizer; she is the settlor's fiduciary.

Where the instrument is silent on the balance between beneficiary classes, the default rules of UTC § 803, Restatement (Third) § 79, the Uniform Principal and Income Act, and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act supply the standard. The trustee must give due regard to the respective interests of the beneficiaries — with neither class systematically preferred — and must act as a reasonable and impartial fiduciary would act under the circumstances.

Silence is not license to prefer. A trustee who observes that the instrument is silent, and takes that silence as authority to favor the beneficiary with whom she is more familiar or more sympathetic, misreads the doctrine. The default rules are neither neutral nor permissive; they impose the ordinary duty of impartial administration.

The most operational face of the duty of impartiality is the allocation of receipts between principal and income accounts and the corresponding allocation of disbursements. The Uniform Principal and Income Act and its 2018 successor, the Uniform Fiduciary Income and Principal Act, supply detailed rules. Cash dividends, rental income, and ordinary interest are generally income. Proceeds of sale, stock dividends, capital gains distributions, and extraordinary receipts are generally principal. Trustee compensation, ordinary maintenance expenses, and interest on borrowing are typically allocated between accounts according to statutory formulas.

These rules are not neutral accounting; they are the doctrinal instantiation of impartiality. Each rule reflects a considered judgment about how the receipt or disbursement bears upon current and remainder interests. A trustee who follows the rules discharges the duty of impartiality on the axis of allocation; a trustee who deviates without warrant in the instrument breaches it.

Where the traditional allocation rules produce an unfair result — most commonly where a total-return investment strategy has produced growth without commensurate income — the trustee may adjust between principal and income to restore impartial administration. UPIA § 104 (1997); UFIPA §§ 203–204 (2018). The power to adjust is itself an instrument of the duty of impartiality: it authorizes the trustee to move economic value between accounts precisely because the underlying investment approach, though prudent, has produced an unfair distribution between classes.

A number of states also permit conversion of an income trust to a unitrust, under which the current beneficiary receives a fixed percentage of trust value each year regardless of the source of the return. UFIPA §§ 301–309. Where authorized and appropriately administered, unitrust conversion is an alternative mechanism for discharging the duty of impartiality across the current/remainder axis. It is not, however, self-executing; the trustee must observe the procedural requirements and must document the reasons for conversion.

Investment decisions are the most consequential arena in which the duty of impartiality operates. Under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, the trustee must consider the trust's investment horizon in light of the interests of both current and remainder beneficiaries. UPIA § 2(c). A portfolio designed exclusively to maximize current yield undervalues the remainderman; a portfolio designed exclusively to maximize long-term appreciation undervalues the current beneficiary. Neither approach is impartial.

The modern doctrinal answer is total-return investment, coupled with the power to adjust or the unitrust conversion. See supra Part VI. The trustee invests for total return — the sum of income and appreciation — and, if necessary, adjusts between accounts so that each beneficiary class receives its share of the total return. The doctrine thus permits the trustee to invest prudently without sacrificing impartiality, and requires her to use the adjustment mechanism when the investment strategy would otherwise produce an inequitable result.

The leading judicial illustration remains Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1984), which held that a trustee who invested exclusively in low-yield equities without regard to the income beneficiary's interest breached both prudence and impartiality. The decision is a cautionary example of the interaction between the two duties: prudent investment is a floor, but impartial investment is a further requirement.

Distribution decisions implicate the duty of impartiality both between classes (current versus remainder, income versus principal) and within a class (concurrent beneficiaries with equal or discretionary interests). The trustee must ensure that the timing, frequency, and amount of distributions bear a rational relation to the interests of each beneficiary affected, as those interests are defined by the instrument and its purposes.

Where distributions are mandatory, impartiality is largely a matter of accurate execution — timely, complete, and in the form the instrument prescribes. Where distributions are discretionary, impartiality operates through the exercise of discretion, and the trustee must be prepared to explain, in terms of the trust's terms and purposes, why she distributed as she did. See infra Part VIII.

The duty of impartiality shapes but does not eliminate the trustee's discretion. UTC § 814; Restatement (Third) § 50. Where the instrument grants the trustee discretion — to distribute among a class, to select among purposes, to prefer one beneficiary over another under a defined standard — the trustee must exercise that discretion in good faith and with due regard to the interests of all beneficiaries affected. She must not exercise the discretion arbitrarily; she must not exercise it to discharge personal favor; she must not exercise it in a manner that systematically defeats the interests of a beneficiary the instrument entitles to consideration.

The standard of judicial review is deferential but not empty. Courts will not substitute their judgment for the trustee's, but they will set aside an exercise of discretion that lacks a rational basis, that is influenced by extraneous considerations, or that reflects a systematic disregard for one class of beneficiaries. Restatement (Third) § 50 cmt. b.

The most common discretionary standards — health, education, maintenance, and support (HEMS); best interests; welfare; comfort — do not displace the duty of impartiality; they channel it. A trustee applying a HEMS standard must give each eligible beneficiary the benefit of consideration under the standard; she may not systematically deploy the standard to prefer one beneficiary at the expense of others. Where the instrument permits unequal distributions among a class, impartiality permits them too — but only on grounds the instrument authorizes.

Documentation is the trustee's protection. A trustee who records the beneficiaries considered, the standard applied, the factual circumstances weighed, and the reasons for the distribution creates a contemporaneous record that supports the exercise of discretion under a claim of partiality. Where records are absent, the trustee bears the practical burden of reconstructing her reasoning under adversarial scrutiny.

Impartiality is most severely tested in family conflicts — second-marriage trusts pitting a surviving spouse against children of a prior marriage; sibling trusts where the beneficiaries are estranged; multigenerational trusts where the current and remainder beneficiaries are unacquainted. The trustee's duty is unchanged by the conflict: she must administer with due regard for the interests of each, without letting the volume, the acrimony, or the sympathy attaching to any single beneficiary displace her impartial judgment.

The practical difficulty is not doctrinal. It lies in maintaining, under sustained pressure, the same standard of consideration for each beneficiary that the doctrine formally requires. Written procedures, disciplined documentation, and — where circumstances warrant — advance judicial guidance under UTC § 201 (jurisdiction over trusts) are the trustee's institutional supports.

Judicial review of impartiality decisions is deferential in form but exacting in substance. Courts do not substitute their judgment for the trustee's, but they review the trustee's process, the record on which she relied, and the rationality of the balance she struck. Where the record shows deliberation, adherence to the instrument, and a defensible balance, the trustee prevails. Where the record shows a systematic pattern of preference for one beneficiary, an absence of contemporaneous documentation, or reliance on extraneous considerations, the trustee is exposed.

The remedy on review is typically corrective rather than punitive: adjustment between principal and income accounts, order of distribution consistent with the instrument, injunction against future partial administration, and — in serious cases — surcharge or removal. UTC §§ 706, 1001–1002.

The remedies for breach of impartiality are those provided generally for breach of trust, applied to the specific injury impartiality is designed to prevent. Where partial administration has shifted economic value between accounts, the remedy is adjustment — the trust is put in the position it would have occupied under impartial administration. Where partial administration has caused a loss, the remedy is surcharge in the amount of the loss. UTC § 1002; Restatement (Third) § 100.

Where the pattern of partiality is systemic or the trustee is unwilling to conform her conduct to the doctrine, removal under UTC § 706 is available. Removal is the strongest signal a court sends about impartial administration; it is reserved for cases in which the beneficiaries cannot be assured of impartial administration under the incumbent trustee, and it should be understood by trustees as the natural consequence of persistent partiality.

Three misconceptions recur in impartiality cases and should be dispatched at the outset.

First, that impartiality means equality. It does not. UTC § 803 cmt.; Restatement (Third) § 79 cmt. b. Impartiality requires due regard for the respective interests of the beneficiaries; those interests are defined by the instrument, and the instrument may make them unequal.

Second, that the settlor's silence is neutral. It is not. Silence invokes the default duty of impartial administration; it does not license the trustee to prefer the beneficiary with whom she is more familiar or more sympathetic.

Third, that discretion insulates the trustee from impartiality review. It does not. UTC § 814. Discretion is exercised within the duty of impartiality; the standard of review is deferential but not empty, and systematic partiality within a discretionary framework is a breach.

For the practicing trustee, the duty of impartiality translates into a small number of durable practices. Identify, at the outset of administration, the beneficiaries whose interests may diverge, and record the axes of divergence. Read the trust instrument for expressions of settlor preference; where preferences are stated, honor them; where they are not, apply the default rules of due regard. Adopt an investment approach that considers both current yield and long-term growth, and use the power to adjust or the unitrust alternative where the traditional allocation rules would produce an inequitable result. Document distribution decisions — the beneficiaries considered, the standard applied, the reasons for the outcome. Communicate with beneficiaries on the terms Chapter 2 established. Where conflicts intensify, seek advance judicial guidance rather than proceed under the shadow of foreseeable litigation.

None of these practices is novel. Each is an ordinary implication of the duty of impartiality as it operates in a well-administered trust. Their cumulative effect is what impartial administration looks like from the outside — the outside from which beneficiaries, courts, and successor trustees will eventually judge the office.

Chapter 9 turns to the third pillar of the trustee's substantive duties: the duty of prudence. Where loyalty asks whose interests the trustee serves, and impartiality asks how she balances the several interests she serves, prudence asks the quality with which she serves them — the care, skill, and caution the office requires. Together the three duties describe the substantive standard by which trust administration is measured.

• Uniform Trust Code §§ 803, 802, 105, 706, 814, 1001–1002.
• Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 79, 78, 50, 100, 227–228.
• Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 183, 232.
• Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997); Uniform Fiduciary Income and Principal Act (2018).
• Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2(c).
• Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Nossaman's Estate, 61 Cal. 2d 630 (1964); Matter of Rowland, 273 A.D.2d 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
• Scott and Ascher on Trusts (5th ed.) § 18.
• Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §§ 541, 612.
• Loring and Rounds: A Trustee's Handbook, ch. 6.