Moore v. City of East Cleveland

MOORE v. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO

Appeal from the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County.

No. 75-6289. Argued November 2, 1976 — Decided May 31, 1977.

Reversed.

POWELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 506. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 513. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 521. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 531. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 541.

Edward R. Stege, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Frances D. Murtaugh, Jr., and Lloyd B. Snyder. Leonard Young argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Henry B. Fischer. Melvin L. Wulf and Benjamin Sheerer filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae.

The report occupies pages 494 through 552 of volume 431 of the United States Reports. The syllabus occupies pages 494 through 497; the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell announcing the judgment runs from page 497 to page 506, closing with the word “Reversed.”; the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan begins at page 506; the opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment begins at page 513; and the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice, of Mr. Justice Stewart, and of Mr. Justice White begin at pages 521, 531, and 541 respectively, the report closing at page 552.

[431 U.S. 494] “Appellant lives in her East Cleveland, Ohio, home with her son and two grandsons (who are first cousins). An East Cleveland housing ordinance limits occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, but defines ‘family’ in such a way that appellant's household does not qualify. Appellant was convicted of a criminal violation of the ordinance. Her conviction was upheld on appeal over her claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional. Appellee city contends that the ordinance should be sustained under Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, which upheld an ordinance imposing limits on the types of groups that could occupy a single dwelling unit. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 498-506; 513-521.”

[431 U.S. 494] “MR. JUSTICE POWELL, joined by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that the ordinance deprived appellant of her liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

[431 U.S. 494] “(a) This case is distinguishable from Belle Terre, supra, where the ordinance affected only unrelated individuals. The ordinance here expressly selects certain categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not, in this instance making it a crime for a grandmother to live with her grandson. Pp. 498-499.”

[431 U.S. 494] “(b) When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, the usual deference to the legislature is inappropriate; and the Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation. P. 499.”

[431 U.S. 494] “(c) The ordinance at best has but a tenuous relationship to the objectives cited by the city: avoiding overcrowding, traffic congestion, and an undue financial burden on the school system. Pp. 499-500.”

[431 U.S. 494] “(d) The strong constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family established in numerous decisions of this Court extends to the family choice involved in this case and is not confined within an arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits of the nuclear family (essentially a couple [431 U.S. 495] and their dependent children). Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but from careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.’ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). The history and tradition of this Nation compel a larger conception of the family. Pp. 500-506.”

[431 U.S. 495] “MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that under the limited standard of review preserved in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, before a zoning ordinance can be declared unconstitutional it must be shown to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable as having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare; that appellee city has failed totally to explain the need for a rule that would allow a homeowner to have grandchildren live with her if they are brothers but not if they are cousins; and that under that standard appellee city's unprecedented ordinance constitutes a taking of property without due process and without just compensation. Pp. 513-521.”

[431 U.S. 498] “The city argues that our decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), requires us to sustain the ordinance attacked here. Belle Terre, like East Cleveland, imposed limits on the types of groups that could occupy a single dwelling unit. Applying the constitutional standard announced in this Court's leading land-use case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926), we sustained the Belle Terre ordinance on the ground that it bore a rational relationship to permissible state objectives.”

[431 U.S. 498] “But one overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre. The ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals. It expressly allowed all who were related by ‘blood, adoption, or marriage’ to live together, and in sustaining the ordinance we were careful to note that it promoted ‘family needs’ and ‘family values.’ 416 U. S., at 9. East Cleveland, in contrast, has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into the family itself. This is no mere incidental result of the ordinance. On its face it selects cer[431 U.S. 499]tain categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not. In particular, it makes a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson in circumstances like those presented here.”

[431 U.S. 499] “When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governs; the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate. ‘This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974). A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399-401 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925), have consistently acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944).”

[431 U.S. 499] “Of course, the family is not beyond regulation. See Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 166. But when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.”

[431 U.S. 499] “When thus examined, this ordinance cannot survive. The city seeks to justify it as a means of preventing over[431 U.S. 500]crowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland's school system. Although these are legitimate goals, the ordinance before us serves them marginally, at best.”

[431 U.S. 500] “For example, the ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmarried children to live together, even if the family contains a half dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car. At the same time it forbids an adult brother and sister to share a household, even if both faithfully use public transportation. The ordinance would permit a grandmother to live with a single dependent son and children, even if his school-age children number a dozen, yet it forces Mrs. Moore to find another dwelling for her grandson John, simply because of the presence of his uncle and cousin in the same household. We need not labor the point. Section 1341.08 has but a tenuous relation to alleviation of the conditions mentioned by the city.”

[431 U.S. 500] “The city would distinguish the cases based on Meyer and Pierce. It points out that none of them ‘gives grandmothers any fundamental rights with respect to grandsons,’ . . . and suggests that any constitutional right to live together as a family extends only to the nuclear family — essentially a couple and their dependent children.”

[431 U.S. 500] “To be sure, these cases did not expressly consider the family relationship presented here. . . . But unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these precedents to the family choice involved in this case.”

[431 U.S. 504] “Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”

[431 U.S. 505] “Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger conception of the family.”

[431 U.S. 506] “By the same token the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children — and its adults — by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.”

[431 U.S. 506] “Reversed.”

Editorial note. The concurrence joined the plurality and added that Belle Terre, the decision principally relied upon by the city, actually supports the result, because the Belle Terre ordinance barred only unrelated individuals from constituting a family and the village had taken special care to emphasise that its ordinance did not inhibit the choice of related individuals to live together, whether in nuclear or extended form.

Editorial note. The opinion further reasoned that the extended family pattern is especially characteristic of, and often economically necessary for, poor and minority households, so that an ordinance confining occupancy to the nuclear family imposes its burden unevenly; and it rejected the suggestion that the availability of a variance procedure mattered, since a criminal defendant need not exhaust an administrative remedy before contending that the ordinance under which she is prosecuted is unconstitutional.

Editorial note. The fifth vote rested on property rather than on family liberty. Reviewing the treatment of occupancy restrictions in state courts, the opinion concluded that an ordinance forbidding a homeowner to shelter her own grandchildren because they are cousins rather than brothers was without precedent, and that the city had failed entirely to explain the need for such a rule.

Editorial note. Measured by the standard preserved in Euclid and Nectow — whether the ordinance is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare — the restriction on the owner's use of her own dwelling could not stand, and the opinion characterised it as a taking of property without due process and without just compensation.

Editorial note. The Chief Justice would have dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had never sought the variance the housing code made available, so that the constitutional question was reached without the record a variance proceeding would have produced.

Editorial note. Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, would have sustained the ordinance under Belle Terre. In his view the appellant's interest in sharing her home with a grandson who was not part of her own nuclear household was not a fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, and the city's density and congestion objectives supplied the rational basis that ordinary land-use legislation requires.

Editorial note. Mr. Justice White accepted that the Due Process Clause has substantive content but objected that resting it on history and tradition would broaden enormously the horizons of the Clause. He would have applied conventional rational-basis review, under which an ordinance permitting a household head to shelter one but not two dependent sons and their children was, in his view, rationally justified; he would have affirmed the judgment.

Editorial note. This record is a research edition, not a substitute for the official reporter. It reproduces the Reporter of Decisions apparatus and reproduces the text of the opinion announcing the judgment in extended verbatim passages arranged in that opinion's own sequence of analysis, each bracketed with the official United States Reports page on which the passage appears. Passages set without quotation marks are Society prose; every quotation mark encloses the words of the opinion or of the Reporter.

Editorial note. No opinion in this case commanded a majority of the Court on its reasoning. The opinion of Mr. Justice Powell was joined by three other Justices and is presented here as the opinion announcing the judgment, not as the opinion of the Court; the fifth vote for reversal was that of Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment on different grounds. Citation of the plurality's reasoning should reflect that fact.

Editorial note. The Court-authored section is a set of SELECTED EXCERPTS, not the complete opinion. Three limitations are declared. First, the numbered footnotes of all opinions are not reproduced, including the plurality's footnote setting out the text of section 1341.08, its footnote on exhaustion of administrative remedies, and its footnote replying to Mr. Justice White. Second, the plurality's extended historical discussion at pages 501 through 504, and its long quotation from Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, are summarised rather than quoted in full. Third, the concurring opinions and all three dissenting opinions are presented as Real Law Society editorial summaries and are not judicial text.

Editorial note. Obvious optical-recognition defects in the digitised bound volume have been silently corrected against the surrounding text; no substantive word has been altered inside a quotation. For the complete official text consult the bound volume through the canonical source recorded with this authority.

Editorial note. Inez Moore lived in her East Cleveland home with her son Dale Moore, Sr., her grandson Dale Moore, Jr., and a second grandson, John Moore, Jr., who had come to live with his grandmother after his mother's death. The two grandsons were first cousins, not brothers. Section 1341.08 of the city's housing code limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to a single family and defined family so that a household containing two grandsons who were cousins did not qualify, although a household containing a dozen children of a single dependent son would have.

Editorial note. In early 1973 the city notified Mrs. Moore that John was an illegal occupant and directed her to comply. When she did not remove him, the city filed a criminal charge. Her motion to dismiss on the ground that the ordinance was facially invalid was overruled, and on conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a twenty-five dollar fine.

Editorial note. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after full consideration of the constitutional claims, and the Supreme Court of Ohio denied review. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction, 425 U.S. 949 (1976), and reversed. Four Justices reversed on substantive due process grounds; Mr. Justice Stevens supplied the fifth vote on the ground that the ordinance was an arbitrary restriction on the use of the owner's property. Three Justices dissented in separate opinions and the Chief Justice would have dismissed the appeal for failure to seek a variance.

Editorial note. The question was whether a single-family occupancy ordinance may define family so as to exclude a grandmother's second grandson. The judgment of the Court is that it may not. Four Justices held that an ordinance intruding on choices concerning family living arrangements is not entitled to the deference given ordinary land-use legislation, must be examined against the importance of the interests advanced and the extent to which they are served, and fails that examination where the fit with congestion and school-burden objectives is tenuous. Mr. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that the restriction was unprecedented, unexplained, and therefore an arbitrary interference with the owner's use of her dwelling.

Editorial note. The plurality's first move was to remove the case from Belle Terre. That ordinance had restricted only unrelated persons and had been sustained precisely because it served family needs and family values; East Cleveland's, by contrast, chose among relatives on the face of the instrument and criminalised a grandmother's decision to shelter her grandson.

Editorial note. Having set deference aside, the plurality tested the fit between the ordinance and the city's asserted interests in overcrowding, traffic, parking, and school finance, and found it marginal: the ordinance tolerated large nuclear households with many drivers while forbidding an adult brother and sister who used public transport to share a home. It then rejected the city's attempt to confine Meyer and Pierce to the nuclear family, reasoning that the accumulated tradition of grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins sharing a household is as venerable as the tradition of the nuclear household and equally deserving of constitutional recognition. Restraint in substantive due process, on this account, comes from respect for history and for the basic values underlying the society, not from drawing an arbitrary boundary at the nuclear family.

Editorial note. Moore fixes the outer limit of the deference announced in Euclid and applied in Belle Terre, and is therefore indispensable to the treatise's treatment of use restrictions on residential property. It establishes the operative distinction in single-family zoning law: a definition of family that excludes unrelated persons is reviewed for rationality, while a definition that selects among relatives is examined closely. Mr. Justice Stevens's separate ground is of independent importance to the law of property, since it treats an unexplained occupancy restriction as an arbitrary deprivation of the owner's use rather than as an intrusion on family liberty.

Editorial note. Followed. Moore is the standing authority limiting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), and is regularly cited for the proposition that the constitutional protection of family living arrangements is not confined to the nuclear family. Its method — identifying protected liberty through history and tradition — was relied upon in later substantive due process decisions of the Court, and its holding continues to govern challenges to definitions of family in municipal occupancy codes.

Editorial note. Read with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), which this decision confines, and with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), which supply the land-use standard invoked by the opinion concurring in the judgment.