Statutory text.
Wherefore our Lord the King, perceiving how necessary and expedient it should be to provide Remedy in the aforesaid Cases, hath ordained, That the Will of the Giver, according to the Form in the Deed of Gift manifestly expressed, shall be from henceforth observed; so that they to whom the Land was given under such Condition, shall have no Power to aliene the Land so given, but that it shall remain unto the Issue of them to whom it was given after their Death, or [shall revert] unto the Giver or his Heirs, if Issue fail [whereas] there is no Issue at all, or if any Issue be, [and fail by Death, or Heir of the Body of such Issue failing:] Neither shall the second Husband of any such Woman, from henceforth, have any thing in the Land so given upon Condition, after the Death of his Wife, by the Law of England, nor the Issue of the second Husband and Wife shall succeed in the Inheritance, but immediately after the Death of the Husband and Wife, to whom the Land was so given, it shall [come to their Issue, or return unto] the Giver, or his Heir, as before is said.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. Before 1285, gifts of land "to A and the heirs of his body" were treated by the royal courts as conditional fees: the donee held a fee simple that became absolute upon the birth of issue, whereupon the donee could alienate and defeat the reversion. The barons obtained the statute to protect the family settlement.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. The statute's declared purpose is to enforce the donor's intention according to the form of the gift, preserving the reversion and the donee's issue against defeasance by the immediate donee's alienation.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. Gifts in the statutory form pass an estate in fee tail: the donee takes a life estate at law, the issue take a corresponding entail interest, and on failure of issue the land reverts to the donor or the donor's heirs. Alienation by the donee is void against the issue and the reverter.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. The statute governs every conveyance in the specified form and, by extension, gifts to a person and the heirs male, or the heirs female, of the donee's body (general and special tails).
Statutory text.
Editorial note. American jurisdictions received the estate tail with reception statutes and abolished or converted it by statute; the doctrinal residue survives in the interpretation of gift language, in the modern policy against perpetual dynastic control of land, and in the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. The estate tail became the principal instrument of the strict family settlement in early-modern England. Its restraint on alienation was mitigated at law by the common recovery and by fine, and abolished outright by statute in the nineteenth century.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. The donor's intention, if expressed in the statutory form, governs descent. The immediate donee may not alienate to defeat the reversion or the issue. The estate is entailed to the specified line and reverts on its failure.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. The seminal case is Taltarum's Case (1472), which recognized the common recovery as a device permitting a tenant in tail to convey a fee simple. American cases treated the abolition of the estate tail as a matter of statute, converting outstanding entails into fee simple or life estate with a fee-simple remainder.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. Modern American courts encounter De Donis chiefly in construing conveyances that use archaic entail language, applying the local abolition statute to translate the archaic form into the modern equivalent.
Statutory text.
Editorial note. See Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1290); Fines and Recoveries Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74; Restatement (First) of Property §§ 59–74 (estates tail).
Statutory text.
Editorial note. Every modern rule that restrains dynastic dead-hand control of land—the Rule Against Perpetuities, statutes abolishing entails, doctrines disfavoring unreasonable restraints on alienation—traces its lineage to the tension between De Donis and the common law's preference for alienable estates.
Editorial commentary — not part of the primary text.
Editorial note. One continuous operative passage within chapter I, from 'Wherefore our Lord the King' through 'as before is said.' The preceding gift examples and explanation, and the following writ forms and concluding provisions, are excluded. This is not the complete chapter.
Editorial note. Line breaks and line-end hyphenation are normalized; opening small capitals are rendered in sentence case. Source square brackets are retained. Marginal summaries, superscript reference marks and the publisher’s variant-reading footnotes are excluded.
Editorial note. Transcription prepared 22 October 2026 from the linked facsimile. This source-specific correction does not update the surrounding doctrinal commentary or establish present legal effect.
Revision history
- 1285-06-28 — Enacted as chapter 1 of the Statute of Westminster II under Edward I.
- 1472-11-15 — Effect mitigated at common law by recognition of the common recovery in Taltarum's Case.
- 1833-08-28 — Repealed and replaced for England by the Fines and Recoveries Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74).
Related Publications
Editorial articles from Real Law Society Press that discuss this authority.
