Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States

MARVIN M. BRANDT REVOCABLE TRUST et al. v. UNITED STATES.

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

No. 12–1173. Argued January 14, 2014 — Decided March 10, 2014.

496 Fed. Appx. 822, reversed and remanded.

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 111.

Steven J. Lechner argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Acting Assistant Attorney General Dreher, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William B. Lazarus, John L. Smeltzer, and Katherine J. Barton.

The report occupies pages 93 through 118 of volume 572 of the United States Reports. The opinion of the Court begins at page 95 and ends at page 110; the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor begins at page 111.

[572 U.S. 93] “Congress passed the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 to provide railroad companies ‘right[s] of way through the public lands of the United States,’ 43 U. S. C. § 934. One such right of way, obtained by a railroad in 1908, crosses land that the United States conveyed to the Brandt family in a 1976 land patent. That patent stated, as relevant here, that the land was granted subject to the railroad's rights in the 1875 Act right of way, but it did not specify what would occur if the railroad later relinquished those rights. Years later, a successor railroad abandoned the right of way with federal approval. The Government then sought a judicial declaration of abandonment and an order quieting title in the United States to the abandoned right of way, including the stretch that crossed the land conveyed in the Brandt patent. Petitioners contested the claim, asserting that the right of way was a mere easement that was extinguished when the railroad abandoned it, so that Brandt now enjoys full title to his land without the burden of the easement. The Government countered that the 1875 Act granted the railroad something more than a mere easement, and that the United States retained a reversionary interest in that land once the railroad abandoned it. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government and quieted title in the United States to the right of way. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.”

[572 U.S. 93] “Held: The right of way was an easement that was terminated by the railroad's abandonment, leaving Brandt's land unburdened. Pp. 102-110.”

[572 U.S. 93] “(a) The Government loses this case in large part because it won when it argued the opposite in Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 262. There, the Government contended that the 1875 Act (unlike pre-1871 statutes granting rights of way) granted nothing more than an easement, and that the railroad in that case therefore had no interest in the resources beneath the surface of its right of way. This Court adopted the Government's position in full. It found the 1875 Act's text ‘wholly inconsistent’ with the grant of a fee interest, id., at 271; agreed with the Government that cases describing the nature of rights of way granted prior to 1871 were ‘not controlling’ because of a major shift in congressional policy concerning land grants to railroads after that year, id., at 278; and [572 U.S. 94] held that the 1875 Act ‘clearly grants only an easement,’ id., at 271. Under well-established common law property principles, an easement disappears when abandoned by its beneficiary, leaving the owner of the underlying land to resume a full and unencumbered interest in the land. See Smith v. Townsend, 148 U. S. 490, 499. Pp. 102-106.”

[572 U.S. 94] “(b) The Government asks this Court to limit Great Northern's characterization of 1875 Act rights of way as easements to the question of who owns the oil and minerals beneath a right of way. But nothing in the 1875 Act's text supports that reading, and the Government's reliance on the similarity of the language in the 1875 Act and pre-1871 statutes directly contravenes the very premise of Great Northern: that the 1875 Act granted a fundamentally different interest than did its predecessor statutes. . . . Finally, later enacted statutes, see 43 U. S. C. §§ 912, 940; 16 U. S. C. § 1248(c), do not define or shed light on the nature of the interest Congress granted to railroads in their rights of way in 1875. They instead purport only to dispose of interests (if any) the United States already possesses. Pp. 106-110.”

[572 U.S. 95] “In the mid-19th century, Congress began granting private railroad companies rights of way over public lands to encourage the settlement and development of the West. Many of those same public lands were later conveyed by the Government to homesteaders and other settlers, with the lands continuing to be subject to the railroads' rights of way. The settlers and their successors remained, but many of the railroads did not. This case presents the question of what happens to a railroad's right of way granted under a particular statute — the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 — when the railroad abandons it: Does it go to the Government, or to the private party who acquired the land underlying the right of way?”

[572 U.S. 96] “What the country did have, however, was land — lots of it. It could give away vast swaths of public land — which at the time possessed little value without reliable transportation — in hopes that such grants would increase the appeal of a transcontinental railroad to private investors. . . . In the early 1860s, Congress began granting to railroad companies rights of way through the public domain, [572 U.S. 97] accompanied by outright grants of land along those rights of way. . . . The land was conveyed in checkerboard blocks.”

[572 U.S. 97] “But public resentment against such generous land grants to railroads began to grow in the late 1860s. . . . By the 1870s, legislators across the political spectrum had embraced a policy of reserving public lands for settlers rather than granting them to railroads.”

[572 U.S. 97] “A House resolution adopted in 1872 summed up the change in national policy, stating: ‘That in the judgment of this House the policy of granting subsidies in public lands to railroads and other corporations ought to be discontinued, and that every consideration of public policy and equal justice to the whole people requires that the public lands should be held for the purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers, and for educational purposes, as may be provided by law.’ Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1585.”

[572 U.S. 98] “Rather than continue to enact special legislation for each such right of way, Congress passed the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 482, 43 U. S. C. §§ 934-939. The 1875 Act provided that ‘[t]he right of way through the public lands of the United States is granted to any railroad company’ meeting certain requirements, ‘to the extent of one hundred feet on each side of the central line of said road.’ § 934. . . . Upon approval by the Interior Department, the right of way would be noted on the land plats held at the local office, and from that day forward ‘all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to the right of way.’ Ibid.”

[572 U.S. 98] “This case requires us to define the nature of the interest granted by the 1875 Act, in order to determine what happens when a railroad abandons its right of way.”

[572 U.S. 99] “In 1976, the United States patented an 83-acre parcel of land in Fox Park, surrounded by the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest, to Melvin and Lulu Brandt. (A land patent is an official document reflecting a grant by a sovereign that is made public, or ‘patent.’) The patent conveyed to the Brandts fee simple title to the land ‘with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances, of whatsoever nature, thereunto belonging, unto said claimants, their successors and assigns, forever.’ . . . But the patent did include limited exceptions and reservations.”

[572 U.S. 100] “In 1987, the Union Pacific sold the rail line, including the right of way, to the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad, which planned to use it as a tourist attraction. . . . That did not prove profitable either, and in 1996 the Wyoming and Colorado notified the Surface Transportation Board of its intent to abandon the right of way. The railroad tore up the tracks and ties and, after receiving Board approval, completed abandonment in 2004. In 2006, the United States initiated this action seeking a judicial declaration of abandonment and an order quieting title in the United States to the abandoned right of way.”

[572 U.S. 101] “Brandt asserted that the stretch of the right of way crossing his family's land was a mere easement that was extinguished upon abandonment by the railroad, so that, under common law property rules, he enjoyed full title to the land without the burden of the easement. The Government countered that it had all along retained a reversionary interest in the railroad right of way — that is, a future estate that would be restored to the United States if the railroad abandoned or forfeited its interest.”

[572 U.S. 101] “The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government and quieted title in the United States to the right of way over Brandt's land. . . . The Court of Appeals affirmed. . . . The court acknowledged division among lower courts regarding the nature of the Government's interest (if any) in abandoned 1875 Act rights of way. But it concluded based on Circuit precedent that the United States had retained an ‘implied reversionary interest’ in the right of way, [572 U.S. 102] which then vested in the United States when the right of way was relinquished.”

[572 U.S. 102] “This dispute turns on the nature of the interest the United States conveyed to the LHP&P in 1908 pursuant to the 1875 Act. . . . The Government does not dispute that easements normally work this way, but maintains that the 1875 Act granted the railroads something more than an easement, reserving an implied reversionary interest in that something more to the United States. The Government loses that argument today, in large part because it won when it argued the opposite before this Court more than 70 years ago, in the case of Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 262 (1942).”

[572 U.S. 103] “The Court adopted the United States' position in full, holding that the 1875 Act ‘clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee.’ Great Northern, 315 U. S., at 271. The Court found Section 4 of the Act ‘especially persuasive,’ because it provided that ‘all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way.’ Ibid. Calling this language ‘wholly inconsistent’ with the grant of a fee interest, the Court endorsed the lower court's statement that ‘[a]pter words to indicate the intent to convey an easement would be difficult to find.’ Ibid.”

[572 U.S. 104] “The dissent is wrong to conclude that Great Northern merely held that ‘the right of way did not confer one particular attribute of fee title.’ Post, at 113 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). To the contrary, the Court specifically rejected the notion that the right of way conferred even a ‘limited fee.’ 315 U. S., at 279 . . . .”

[572 U.S. 104] “When the United States patented the Fox Park parcel to Brandt's parents in 1976, it conveyed fee simple title to that land, ‘subject to those rights for railroad purposes’ that had been granted to the LHP&P. The United States did not reserve to itself any interest in the right of way in that patent. Under Great Northern, the railroad thus had an easement in its right of way over land owned by the Brandts.”

[572 U.S. 104] “The essential features of easements — including, most important here, what happens when they cease to be used — [572 U.S. 105] are well settled as a matter of property law. An easement is a ‘nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.’ Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.2(1) (1998). ‘Unlike most possessory estates, easements . . . may be unilaterally terminated by abandonment, leaving the servient owner with a possessory estate unencumbered by the servitude.’ Id., § 1.2, Comment d . . . . In other words, if the beneficiary of the easement abandons it, the easement disappears, and the landowner resumes his full and unencumbered interest in the land. See Smith v. Townsend, 148 U. S. 490, 499 (1893) . . . .”

[572 U.S. 106] “Those basic common law principles resolve this case. When the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad abandoned the right of way in 2004, the easement referred to in the Brandt patent terminated. Brandt's land became unburdened of the easement, conferring on him the same full rights over the right of way as he enjoyed over the rest of the Fox Park parcel.”

[572 U.S. 106] “Contrary to that straightforward conclusion, the Government now tells us that Great Northern did not really mean what it said. Emphasizing that Great Northern involved only the question of who owned the oil and minerals beneath a right of way, the Government asks the Court to limit its characterization of 1875 Act rights of way as ‘easements’ to that context. . . . But nothing in the text of the 1875 Act supports such an improbable (and self-serving) reading.”

[572 U.S. 106] “The Government argues that the similarity in the language of the 1875 Act and the pre-1871 statutes shows that Congress intended to reserve a reversionary interest in the lands granted under the 1875 Act, just as it did in the pre-1871 statutes. . . . But that is directly contrary to the very premise of this Court's decision (and the Government's argument) in Great Northern: that the 1875 Act granted a fundamentally different interest in the rights of way than did the predecessor statutes.”

[572 U.S. 109] “The Government argues that these statutes prove that Congress intended to retain (or at least believed it had retained) a reversionary interest in 1875 Act rights of way. Otherwise, the argument goes, these later statutes providing for the disposition of the abandoned or forfeited strips of land would have been meaningless. That is wrong. This case turns on what kind of interest Congress granted to railroads in their rights of way in 1875. . . . Great Northern answered that question: an easement. The statutes the Government cites do not purport to define (or redefine) the nature of the interest conveyed under the 1875 Act.”

[572 U.S. 109] “In other words, these statutes do not tell us whether the United States has an interest in any particular right of way; they simply tell us how any interest the United States might have should be disposed of. . . . But if there is no ‘right, title, interest, [or] estate of the United States’ in the right of way, 43 U. S. C. § 912, then the statutes simply do not apply.”

[572 U.S. 110] “We cannot overlook the irony in the Government's argument based on Sections 912 and 940. Those provisions plainly evince Congress's intent to divest the United States of any title or interest it had retained to railroad rights of way, and to vest that interest in individuals to whom the underlying land had been patented — in other words, people just like the Brandts. It was not until 1988 — 12 years after the United States patented the Fox Park parcel to the Brandts — that Congress did an about-face and attempted to reserve the rights of way to the United States. That policy shift cannot operate to create an interest in land that the Government had already given away.”

[572 U.S. 110] “More than 70 years ago, the Government argued before this Court that a right of way granted under the 1875 Act was a simple easement. The Court was persuaded, and so ruled. Now the Government argues that such a right of way is tantamount to a limited fee with an implied reversionary interest. We decline to endorse such a stark change in position, especially given ‘the special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned.’ Leo Sheep Co., supra, at 687.”

[572 U.S. 110] “The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[572 U.S. 110] “It is so ordered.”

[572 U.S. 111] “The Court bases today's holding almost entirely on Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 262, 271 (1942), and its conclusion that the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 granted ‘only an easement, and not a fee,’ to a railroad possessing a right of way. The Court errs, however, in two ways. First, it does not meaningfully grapple with prior cases — Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 271 (1903), and Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U. S. 44, 47 (1915) — that expressly concluded that the United States retained a reversionary interest in railroad rights of way. To the extent the Court regards Great Northern as having abrogated these precedents, it places on Great Northern more weight than that case will bear. Second, the Court relies on ‘basic common law principles,’ ante, at 106, without recognizing that courts have long treated railroad rights of way as sui generis property rights not governed by the ordinary common-law regime. Because Townsend and Stringham largely dictate the conclusion that the Government retained a reversionary interest when it granted the right of way at issue, and because any ambiguity in land grants ‘is to be resolved favorably to a sovereign grantor,’ Great Northern, 315 U. S., at 272, I respectfully dissent.”

Editorial note. This record is a research edition, not a substitute for the official reporter. It reproduces the Reporter of Decisions apparatus and reproduces the Court's own text in verbatim passages arranged under the Court's own numbered divisions, each bracketed with the official United States Reports page on which the passage appears. Passages set without quotation marks are Society prose; every quotation mark in this record encloses the Court's or the Reporter's words.

Editorial note. The Court-authored sections of this record are SELECTED EXCERPTS, not complete opinions. Four limitations are declared. First, the numbered footnotes of both opinions — including footnote 4 of the opinion of the Court, which explains why the grantor of an easement retains no reversionary interest, and footnote 5, which answers the dissent on construction in favour of the sovereign grantor — are not reproduced. Second, the Court's narrative history of the transcontinental land grants at pages 95 through 97, and its account of the railway's corporate history at pages 99 and 100, are quoted only in part. Third, the Court's discussion of Stalker v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. and Great Northern R. Co. v. Steinke, at pages 107 and 108, is summarised rather than quoted. Fourth, the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor, occupying pages 111 through 118, appears as its opening statement with a Society summary of its argument; it is not reproduced in full.

Editorial note. Obvious typographic and scanning defects in the digitised bound volume — including the systematic loss of the 'fi' and 'ffi' ligatures in words such as “filed,” “financial,” “official,” and “affirmed” — have been silently corrected against the surrounding text; no substantive word has been altered, modernised, or paraphrased inside a quotation. For any purpose requiring the complete official text, consult the bound volume through the canonical source recorded with this authority.

Editorial note. Justice Sotomayor dissented alone. She argued that Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 (1903), and Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 (1915), had expressly recognised a reversionary interest in the United States; that Great Northern resolved only the narrower question of subsurface rights and could not bear the weight the Court placed upon it; that railroad rights of way had long been treated as sui generis interests outside the ordinary common-law regime of servitudes; and that ambiguity in a land grant should be resolved in favour of the sovereign grantor.

Editorial note. In 1908 the United States granted the Laramie, Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railway Company a right of way across land in the Medicine Bow National Forest under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875. In 1976 the United States patented an eighty-three acre parcel crossed by that right of way to the Brandts' predecessor; the patent expressly conveyed the land subject to the railroad's rights but said nothing about what would happen if the railroad ceased to use them. The railroad's successor obtained authority to abandon the line, removed the track and ties, and in 2004 the abandonment was completed. The United States then brought suit to quiet title to the abandoned strip in itself.

Editorial note. The District Court granted summary judgment for the United States, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the United States retained a reversionary interest. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Editorial note. The 1875 Act granted an easement and nothing more. The rule derived is that a common-law easement terminates upon abandonment, and the owner of the underlying fee then holds the land unburdened; the grantor of an easement retains no reversionary interest capable of ripening into possession, because an easement is not an estate carved out of the fee with a possibility of reverter. The Government's contrary position was foreclosed by its own successful argument in Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942), where it had persuaded the Court that the 1875 Act conveyed only an easement.

Editorial note. Chief Justice Roberts began from Great Northern, which construed the 1875 Act after a change in congressional policy away from outright grants of land to railroads, and held that the statute conveyed an easement for railroad purposes only. He observed that the Government had prevailed on precisely that reading and now sought the benefit of the opposite one, and he declined to divide the statute's operation according to which party the construction favoured. He then applied the ordinary consequences of the easement classification: the servient owner's title is presently possessory and merely burdened; abandonment of the easement removes the burden; and the grantor's interest, having been fully conveyed away by the patent, does not revive. Statutes providing for the disposition of railroad rights of way, chiefly the Act of March 8, 1922, were held to presuppose rather than alter that classification. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, argued that railroad rights of way had long been treated as sui generis and that Great Northern had resolved only the question of subsurface rights, leaving the reversionary question open.

Editorial note. Brandt is a demonstration, on a very large practical scale, of the consequences that follow from classifying an interest correctly. The classification of the 1875 Act grants as easements determines the ownership of thousands of miles of abandoned railroad corridors, and therefore the legal foundation of the rails-to-trails programme, the exposure of the United States to compensation claims by adjoining owners, and the title position of every purchaser of land crossed by a former line. For the treatise the case belongs both to the law of easements — creation, scope, and termination by abandonment — and to the chapters on public land grants and on title assurance.

Editorial note. Followed. Applied in the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit in adjudicating takings claims arising from the conversion of abandoned corridors to trail use, and relied on generally for the proposition that abandonment of an easement leaves the fee unburdened in the servient owner.

Editorial note. Read with the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (repealed in part), and the treatise chapters on easements, on termination of servitudes, and on public land grants and patents.