Kelo v. City of New London

KELO ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW LONDON ET AL.

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.

No. 04-108. Argued February 22, 2005 — Decided June 23, 2005.

268 Conn. 1, 843 A. 2d 500, affirmed.

Scott G. Bullock argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were William H. Mellor, Dana Berliner, and Scott W. Sawyer. Wesley W. Horton argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Daniel J. Krisch, Thomas J. Londregan, Jeffrey T. Londregan, and Edward B. O'Connell.

The report occupies pages 469 through 523 of volume 545 of the United States Reports. The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Stevens, begins at page 472 and closes at page 490. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion (pages 490–493). Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined (pages 494–505). Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion (pages 505–523).

[545 U.S. 469] “After approving an integrated development plan designed to revitalize its ailing economy, respondent city, through its development agent, purchased most of the property earmarked for the project from willing sellers, but initiated condemnation proceedings when petitioners, the owners of the rest of the property, refused to sell. Petitioners brought this state-court action claiming, inter alia, that the taking of their properties would violate the ‘public use’ restriction in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. . . . Relying on cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, and Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding all of the proposed takings.”

[545 U.S. 469] “Held: The city's proposed disposition of petitioners' property qualifies as a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Pp. 477–490.”

[545 U.S. 469] “(a) Though the city could not take petitioners' land simply to confer a private benefit on a particular private party, . . . the takings at issue here would be executed pursuant to a carefully considered development plan, which was not adopted ‘to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals,’ ibid. Moreover, . . . this ‘Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the . . . public.’ . . . Rather, it has embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’ . . . Without exception, the Court has defined that concept broadly, reflecting its long­standing policy of deference to legislative judgments as to what public needs justify the use of the takings power. Berman, 348 U. S. 26; Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986. Pp. 477–483.”

[545 U.S. 470] “(b) The city's determination that the area at issue was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to deference. . . . Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 483–484.”

[545 U.S. 470] “(c) Petitioners' proposal that the Court adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use is supported by neither precedent nor logic. Promoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted governmental function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it from the other public purposes the Court has recognized. . . . Pp. 484–490.”

[545 U.S. 470] “268 Conn. 1, 843 A. 2d 500, affirmed.”

[545 U.S. 470] “Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 490. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 494. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 505.”

[545 U.S. 472] “In 2000, the city of New London approved a development plan that, in the words of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, was ‘projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.’ 268 Conn. 1, 5, 843 A. 2d 500, 507 (2004). In assembling the land needed for this project, the city's development agent has purchased property from willing sellers and proposes to use the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property from unwilling owners in exchange for just compensation. The question presented is whether the city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”

[545 U.S. 479] “[T]his ‘Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.’ . . . Indeed, while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed ‘use by the public’ as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the ‘use by the public’ test difficult to administer . . . but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society.”

[545 U.S. 480] “[W]hen this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’ See, e. g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 158-164 (1896).”

[545 U.S. 483] “For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”

[545 U.S. 483] “Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference. The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including — but by no means limited to — new jobs and increased tax revenue.”

[545 U.S. 484] “Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”

[545 U.S. 489] “In affirming the City's authority to take petitioners' properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation. We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.”

[545 U.S. 490] “Because over a century of our case law interpreting that provision dictates an affirmative answer to that question, we may not grant petitioners the relief that they seek.”

[545 U.S. 490] “The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is affirmed. It is so ordered.”

[545 U.S. 490] “I join the opinion for the Court and add these further observations. This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 5, as long as it is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’ . . . The determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does not, however, alter the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”

[545 U.S. 494] “Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on government power. Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded — i. e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public — in the process. To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development takings ‘for public use’ is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property — and thereby effectively to delete the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly I respectfully dissent.”

[545 U.S. 505] “Long ago, William Blackstone wrote that ‘the law of the land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private property.’ . . . The Framers embodied that principle in the Constitution, allowing the government to take property not for ‘public necessity,’ but instead for ‘public use.’ Amdt. 5.”

[545 U.S. 506] “Defying this understanding, the Court replaces the Public Use Clause with a ‘‘[P]ublic [P]urpose’’ Clause . . . a restriction that is satisfied, the Court instructs, so long as the purpose is ‘legitimate’ and the means ‘not irrational’ . . . .”

Editorial note. This record is a research edition, not a substitute for the official reporter. It reproduces the Reporter of Decisions apparatus in full and reproduces the opinions in extended verbatim excerpts, arranged under the Court's own sequence of analysis, each bracketed with the official United States Reports page on which the passage appears. Every quotation mark encloses the Court's or the Reporter's own words.

Editorial note. Four limitations are declared. First, Parts I and II of the majority opinion (pages 472 through 478), which recite the New London Development Corporation's plan and the procedural history at length, are reproduced only in the load-bearing sentences that identify the question presented; the balance is summarised in the Facts and Procedural History sections below. Second, the historical survey of public-use jurisprudence and its accompanying footnotes (pages 480 through 483) are reproduced only in the passages that carry the doctrinal holding. Third, the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy (pages 490 through 493) and the dissenting opinions of Justice O'Connor (pages 494 through 505) and Justice Thomas (pages 505 through 523) are represented by their opening statements of position; the reader is referred to the bound volume for the full separate opinions. Fourth, the Court's footnotes are not reproduced except where directly quoted; typographic artefacts of the reporter's soft hyphenation have been silently corrected.

Editorial note. After decades of economic decline, New London approved a development plan for the Fort Trumbull area intended to create jobs, increase tax revenues, and capitalise on the construction of a nearby research facility. The plan contemplated a waterfront conference hotel, research and office space, a marina, and new residences, and it was to be carried out by a private nonprofit development corporation designated as the city's agent. The city authorised the acquisition of the required parcels by purchase or eminent domain. The petitioners owned fifteen properties in the area, some occupied as homes of long standing, and their properties were not themselves blighted or in poor condition.

Editorial note. The Superior Court granted a partial injunction against some of the takings. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held all of the takings valid under both the Federal and the State Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and affirmed.

Editorial note. The city's proposed use of the condemned land qualifies as a public use. The rule derived has three parts. First, the constitutional requirement is not literal use by the public, but a public purpose, and the Court has long rejected the narrower reading. Second, the fact that condemned property will be transferred to private parties does not defeat the public character of the taking, provided the transfer is a means of executing a public programme rather than a bare transfer of one owner's property to another. Third, the determination that a particular area is in need of economic rejuvenation, and the choice of means to accomplish it, are legislative judgments entitled to deference, and the plan is to be judged as a whole rather than parcel by parcel.

Editorial note. Justice Stevens relied on Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), as establishing both the breadth of the public purpose concept and the deference owed to the legislative body. He declined to adopt a rule requiring reasonable certainty that the expected benefits would materialise, or a rule excluding economic development as a category, and he emphasised that nothing in the opinion prevented a State from imposing stricter limits under its own law. Justice Kennedy, concurring, added that a taking would fail if the record showed that the plan's public benefits were incidental to a purpose of favouring a particular private party. Justice O'Connor, dissenting, argued that the majority effaced any distinction between private and public use and that the burden of such takings would fall on those with the least influence. Justice Thomas, dissenting separately, urged a return to the original understanding of 'public use' as actual use by the public.

Editorial note. Kelo settles the federal question and, in doing so, transfers the substantive control of eminent domain to the States. Its invitation to state-law limitation was accepted on an extraordinary scale: within a few years the great majority of States had enacted restrictions on condemnation for economic development, and several state supreme courts construed their own public-use clauses more strictly than the Federal Constitution requires. The treatise therefore presents Kelo as the boundary of federal doctrine and treats the operative law of public use as predominantly a matter of state constitutions and statutes.

Editorial note. Reaffirmed as federal law and repeatedly cited for the public purpose standard and for legislative deference. Its scope in practice has been narrowed by post-2005 state eminent domain reform legislation and by state constitutional decisions declining to follow it, a development the opinion itself expressly contemplated.

Editorial note. Read with U.S. Const. amend. V, and the treatise chapters on eminent domain and public use and on regulatory takings.